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ACCOUNTABILITY CLAIMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos
ABSTRACT—Several of the Supreme Court’s most controversial
constitutional doctrines hinge on claims about electoral accountability.
Restrictions on the President’s power to remove agency heads are disfavored
because they reduce the President’s accountability for agency actions.
Congress cannot delegate certain decisions to agencies because then
Congress is less accountable for those choices. State governments cannot be
federally commandeered because such conscription lessens their
accountability. And campaign spending must be unregulated so that more
information reaches voters and helps them to reward or punish incumbents
for their performances.
There is just one problem with these claims. They are wrong—at least
for the most part. To illustrate their error, I identify four conditions that must
be satisfied in order for incumbents to be held accountable. Voters must (1)
know about incumbents’ records, (2) form judgments about them, (3)
attribute responsibility for them, and (4) cast ballots based on these
judgments and attributions. I then present extensive empirical evidence
showing that these conditions typically are not met in the scenarios
contemplated by the Court. The crux of the problem is that voters are less
informed than the Court supposes, more likely to be biased by their partisan
affiliations, and less apt to vote retrospectively than in some other way.
Accountability thus does not rise in response to the Court’s interventions—
at least not much.
The qualifiers, though, are important. If the Court’s claims are mostly
wrong, then they are partly right. If accountability does not rise much due to
the Court’s efforts, then it does go up a bit. These points are established by
the same studies that document the general inadequacy of the Court’s
reasoning. With respect to certain voters in certain settings, accountability is
influenced by presidential control over agencies, congressional delegation to
agencies, federal commandeering of state governments, and regulation of
campaign spending. That is why this Article discounts accountability as a
constitutional value but not does reject it altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
Say (not implausibly) that a natural disaster strikes and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responds poorly to it. FEMA is
an executive agency whose head may be removed at will by the President.1
At the next election, does this feature of FEMA’s mean that voters will
1
See About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency [https://perma.cc/3R2VL2VQ].
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punish the President more harshly for the agency’s subpar performance than
if it were an independent body more insulated from presidential control? In
other words, is the President more electorally accountable for the actions of
an agency over which she exercises more authority?
Now assume (a bit less accurately) that Congress previously delegated
to FEMA the power to respond to disasters as the agency sees fit.2 Thanks to
this delegation, Congress need not take any new steps when the present
calamity arises. Instead, it may sit back and allow FEMA to lead the relief
effort. At the next election, will voters be more apt to support members of
Congress than if they had been compelled to address the emergency
themselves (stipulating legislative ineptitude equal to the agency’s)? That is,
does Congress reduce its electoral accountability by delegating authority in
earlier periods and so avoiding difficult decisions in later ones?
A third scenario: Under current law, state governments are the frontline responders to disasters. It is up to them whether to deal with crises on
their own or to request a federal declaration that paves the way for federal
assistance.3 They cannot be commandeered into carrying out a federal relief
program against their will. If state politicians bungle the situation, then, does
their autonomy mean they will incur worse consequences at the polls than if
they had been dragooned by the feds? Does the ban on commandeering
increase their electoral accountability?
And a fourth case: At present, campaign spending is unrestricted in all
American elections.4 There is no limit to the amount of money that may be
used to convey to voters unattractive aspects of incumbents’ records—such
as their flawed responses to disasters. Do these unchecked outlays cause
incumbents to pay a steeper price for poor performance than if the river of
money (and information) did not gush as freely? Does campaign finance
deregulation improve electoral accountability?
The Supreme Court gives the same answer to all of these questions: yes.
Yes, the President is more accountable for the actions of agencies whose
heads she may remove at will.5 Yes, Congress is less accountable when it
2

This assumption is imperfect because FEMA was created by an executive order in 1979, not by an
explicit delegation of congressional power. See id. However, Congress did provide the agency with
statutory authority—and establish the current cooperative federalist approach to emergency relief—in the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689
(1988).
3
See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012) (providing that “[a]ll requests for a declaration by the President that a
major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State”).
4
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (finding “no basis for allowing the
Government to limit . . . independent expenditures”).
5
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010)
(holding that a limit on the President’s removal power “subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the
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farms out important decisions to agencies.6 Yes, state governments are more
accountable when they are not pressed into service by their federal
overseers.7 And yes, incumbents at all levels are more accountable when no
cap exists on campaign spending.8
What is more, the Court’s accountability claims are no casual asides.
Rather, they are pillars of some of the most consequential holdings in all of
constitutional law. The President’s (allegedly) enhanced accountability for
agencies with easily discarded heads helps explain why limits on her removal
power are disfavored.9 Congress’s (supposedly) lessened accountability
when it assigns significant matters to agencies is one of the justifications for
the nondelegation doctrine.10 That state governments are (ostensibly) more
accountable when they are not federally conscripted partly accounts for the
prohibition of commandeering.11 And that incumbents are (purportedly)
more accountable when campaign spending is unfettered is one reason why
expenditure restrictions are unlawful.12
As the parentheticals hint, this Article’s thesis is that the Court’s
accountability claims are wrong—at least for the most part. In recent years,
there has been an outpouring of political science scholarship on the causes
of electoral accountability. This literature is largely inconsistent with the
Court’s assertions. It suggests that accountability does not budge, at least not
much, in response to factors as fine as presidential removal authority,
congressional delegation, federal commandeering, and campaign finance
regulation. But the caveats—for the most part, largely, at least not much—
are noteworthy too. There is a grain of truth in the Court’s analysis, though
only in certain unusual circumstances. That is why this Article discounts
accountability as a constitutional value but does not reject it altogether.
laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts”); see also
infra Section II.A.
6
See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about
to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress . . . .”); see also infra Section II.B. This answer
is phrased differently than the others (Congress is less accountable when it delegates, not more
accountable when it does not) because of the desuetude of the nondelegation doctrine. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (quipping that the doctrine “has had
one good year, and 211 bad ones”).
7
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Government
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); see also
infra Section II.C.
8
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it
is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”); see also infra Section II.D.
9
See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498.
10
See Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
11
See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
12
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
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Before delving into the political scientists’ findings, a working
definition of electoral accountability is essential. It is voters rewarding (by
voting for) elected officials for good decisions and outcomes, and punishing
(by voting against) them for bad ones. So conceived, electoral accountability
operates through the mechanism of retrospective voting, that is, voting on
the basis of incumbents’ past records. Retrospective voting, in turn, occurs
only if four conditions are met: (1) voters know about these records; (2)
voters form judgments about them; (3) voters attribute responsibility for
them; and (4) voters cast ballots based on these judgments and attributions.13
Of course, not all accountability is electoral. Within hierarchical
organizations we find managerial accountability: subordinates being
rewarded by their supervisors for good decisions and outcomes, and
punished for bad ones. In many contexts there is also legal accountability:
the judicial system’s imposition of penalties for violations of the law. More
colloquially, people are personally accountable to their friends and loved
ones, ethically accountable to themselves, and so on. But while they are
undeniably important, I bracket these other types of accountability here.
They are not the types about which the Court has made strong claims in the
course of announcing controversial constitutional rules. They are therefore
not my present concern.14
Similarly, not all voting is retrospective. One alternative, in fact, is its
exact opposite: prospective voting based on candidates’ expected future
behavior. Another option is spatial voting for candidates whose policy
positions are closer ideologically to the voter’s. Still other possibilities
include voting on the basis of candidates’ partisan affiliations, demographic
traits, or valence qualities. And this is not a pick-one game; voters can (and
do) vote on multiple grounds simultaneously.15
Unlike the other kinds of accountability, I do not bracket these rival
modes of voting. Their existence, in fact, is an essential reason why the
Court’s claims fall flat. If voters are not voting retrospectively to begin with,
then electoral accountability cannot be improved by requiring or forbidding
certain institutional arrangements.
So what have political scientists concluded about how voters cast their
ballots? At the presidential level, some retrospective voting does take
place—but based on coarse-grained factors like the state of the economy, not
subtler issues like specific agency actions. In direct comparative tests,
retrospective voting is also dominated by prospective, spatial, partisan, and

13
14
15

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
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demographic voting.16 At the congressional level, retrospective economic
voting is even less common, and the vast majority of members’ votes carry
no electoral consequences. Meanwhile, a non-congressional variable—the
President’s approval rating—emerges as a potent driver of vote choice.
Congressional elections are thus partly second-order: races shaped by
developments at other governmental levels.17 As for the states, their elections
are predominantly, not just partly, second-order affairs. State legislative
results correlate nearly perfectly with national trends, while scholars debate
whether governors’ economic and fiscal records affect at all their showings
at the polls.18
This evidence relates to the last condition for retrospective voting:
whether voters cast ballots based on their judgments of, and attributions for,
past decisions and outcomes. The answer is no, or more precisely, not to a
significant extent. Other studies shed light on the first condition: whether
voters even know about the decisions and outcomes in the first place. Here,
too, the empirical verdict is negative, revealing another reason why the
Court’s accountability claims are implausible. Voters simply are not
informed enough about agency actions, Congress members’ positions, or
state government policies to vote on their basis.
A half-century of survey research documents Americans’ startling
ignorance of officeholders’ records. Most respondents cannot name a single
bill their congressional representatives have supported or opposed over the
past few years. Their awareness of agency regulations and state laws, which
typically attract less media coverage, is even more scant. And their lack of
knowledge of individual actions is not offset by familiarity with the actions’
overall effects. Large fractions of respondents hold inaccurate views of
economic growth, the unemployment rate, the budget deficit, and a host of
other indicators.19
Turning to the second condition for retrospective voting—whether
voters are able to form judgments about policies and their consequences—
the literature points to a superficially optimistic but ultimately gloomy
conclusion. The good news is that voters are willing to offer assessments of
all sorts of issues. The trouble is that these evaluations are weakly tethered
to objective reality and heavily swayed by voters’ partisan affiliations.
Democratic voters tend to approve of Democratic officeholders’ records
16
See infra Section III.A. To save space and avoid repetition, I do not provide citations here for my
summary of the political science literature on accountability. The relevant citations are supplied—in
abundance—in Part III, infra.
17
See infra Section III.B.
18
See infra Section III.C.
19
See infra Sections III.A–C.
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(even when poor) and to frown on those of Republican incumbents (even
when strong). Republican voters exhibit the opposite pattern. As a result, the
policy appraisals on which retrospective voting depends are distorted.
Incumbents are not punished by their copartisans even when they should be,
or rewarded by the opposing party’s supporters even when they deserve it.20
This leaves the third condition: whether voters are able to attribute
responsibility correctly to elected officials. Most of the Court’s
accountability claims involve this condition; their premise is that voters
make better attributions when the President has more control over agencies,
Congress delegates fewer decisions, and state governments are more
autonomous. But for a pair of reasons that should already be unsurprising,
this premise is flawed. First, most voters know little about which institution
is in charge of which policy. Only about half of the public can identify the
majority party in Congress, and this fraction drops further for state
legislatures. Much of the public also believes the President is responsible for
events that are outside her ambit: congressional gridlock, national economic
trends, natural disasters, and the like.21
Second, voters’ attributions are biased by their partisan affiliations.
When conditions are good, they tend to give credit to their own party. When
circumstances are worse, they usually deem it the other party’s fault. Who is
thought to be in charge is therefore highly variable, shifting in response to
policy assessments (themselves driven by partisanship) and configurations
of party control. In combination, these arguments pull the rug from under the
Court’s claims. Accountability cannot rise much due to greater presidential
authority, less congressional delegation, or more state governmental
independence, because these factors are dwarfed by voters’ ignorance of
institutional duties and readiness to adjust their attributions on partisan
grounds. The Court assumes a level of sophistication and impartiality on the
part of voters that they mostly fail to meet.22
The Court further errs in its assertions about campaign finance
regulation, though for different reasons that relate jointly to all four
conditions for retrospective voting. Here the problem is that while regulation
may reduce total outlays, and so the information available to voters about
candidates’ records, it also makes elections more competitive, thus
increasing accountability. Why does regulation lead to more competitive
elections? Because it typically constrains incumbents more than challengers,
shrinking the former’s spending advantage and, with it, their margin of

20
21
22

See infra Sections III.A–C.
See infra Sections III.A–C.
See infra Sections III.A–C.
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victory. And why does more intense competition result in greater
accountability? Both because incumbents are more likely to lose in closer
races and, intriguingly, because voters become better informed and more apt
to vote retrospectively as elections grow more unpredictable. Put these
findings together and the Court has it exactly backward. It is the imposition
of campaign finance limits, not their removal, that makes incumbents more
accountable to the electorate.23
By this point, a reader may be forgiven for wondering why this Article
insists on discounting—but not rejecting—accountability. What is left to
salvage in the Court’s claims? In fact, they may have some validity, at least
for certain voters in certain situations. The arguments’ outright disavowal is
therefore premature. Start with the President’s power to remove agency
heads. Recent studies find that voters attribute more responsibility to the
President when they learn from the media that she has more sway over an
agency. Of course, many voters fail to receive this information, and even
those that do may cast their ballots on other grounds. Nevertheless, one of
the conditions for retrospective voting is more likely to be satisfied under the
Court’s preferred institutional arrangement.24
Likewise, other work shows that while members of Congress face no
electoral consequences for most of their votes, some of their stances do
matter at the polls. This suggests that if the nondelegation doctrine were
enforced, obliging Congress to tackle issues it currently assigns to agencies,
members would be held accountable for at least a few of their extra
decisions.25 Additionally, even though most voters cannot say which level of
government is responsible for which policy, better educated voters
sometimes possess this knowledge. This informed minority can reward or
punish state officeholders for decisions that were, in fact, theirs to make.26
Lastly, one major category of campaign finance regulation—the banning of
“soft money” donations to political parties—does reduce competition, and
with it, accountability. Parties channel most of their soft money to
challengers, so when this spigot is turned off, incumbents can breathe a bit
easier.27
But these are all silver linings on a dark cloud. The Court’s
accountability claims are much more wrong than right, which raises the
question of why the Court’s assertions are so inaccurate. The most
sympathetic explanation is that the Court wishes to promote accountability
23
24
25
26
27
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because it (justifiably) considers it a vital democratic value. The Court then
latches onto the forces under its control that seem most apt to improve
accountability, most of which involve the relations between governmental
institutions. But these forces are not actually as potent as the Court thinks.
Fundamental institutional decisions—whether to separate powers or fuse
them, or whether to create a unitary or federal system—indeed have dramatic
implications for accountability. These kinds of choices, though, are not
within the Court’s jurisdiction. Nor are the key non-institutional drivers of
accountability: voters’ knowledge, partisanship, and mode of voting. At their
core, these are matters of voter psychology, not constitutional law.28
This is not to say the Court could not advance accountability more
adeptly than it has to date. For one thing, it could temper its hostility toward
campaign finance regulation, which unlike the policies the Court believes
make incumbents more accountable, demonstrably does so. For another, the
Court could disrupt the many anticompetitive practices that dot American
elections: bipartisan gerrymanders that insulate both parties’ incumbents
from serious challenges, ballot access rules that make it difficult for third
parties to vie for office, nonpartisan races that deprive voters of their most
useful cue, and so on. These examples hint that the Court’s project might be
more successful if it shifted focus from institutional relations to the fostering
of competition. Most aspects of governmental structure do not move the
accountability needle, while closer elections both have an impact and can be
encouraged by the Court.29
More drastic measures are possible as well. One understandable
response to the Court’s mistakes is to argue that it should get out of the
functionalism game altogether. If it cannot predict with any certainty
whether its chosen democratic value will be furthered by its intervention,
perhaps it simply should not intervene on this basis. Perhaps, that is, it should
stick to more conventional modalities: text, history, precedent, and the like.
A different response, to which I am more partial, is to suggest that the
problem might be with the particular value endorsed by the Court. Other
values, like participation, deliberation, or congruence with voters’
preferences, might be more amenable to judicial cultivation.30 If this is the
case, then there is no need for the Court to abandon its democratic mission.
The mission just needs to be revised to be more feasible.31

28

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
30
For an article-length defense of judicial intervention based on congruence with the median voter’s
preferences, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014).
31
See infra Section IV.C.
29
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The Article takes the following route. First, in Part I, I elaborate on the
concept of accountability. I identify the elements that are necessary for
retrospective voting to occur, and contrast electoral accountability and
retrospective voting with their alternatives. Next, in Part II, I explicate the
Court’s accountability claims. They involve the President’s power to remove
agency heads, Congress’s delegation to agencies, the federal
commandeering of state governments, and the regulation of campaign
spending. Part III is then the Article’s empirical core. In it, I present the
political science evidence that rebuts the Court’s assertions, proceeding in
order through all four conditions for retrospective voting. I also highlight the
minority of studies that lend some tentative support to the Court’s analysis.
Finally, in Part IV, I address some of the intriguing issues implicated by the
preceding discussion: why the Court errs so profoundly, how the Court could
promote accountability more effectively, and whether the Court should
intervene on other, more defensible grounds.
I also note at the outset that I am not the first to notice—or even to
criticize—the Court’s accountability claims. Several other scholars have
done so, typically asserting that accountability is an unappealing value32 or
that it cannot be achieved through elections.33 My contributions, then, are to
reveal the full range of the Court’s claims, to parse retrospective voting into
its constituent elements, to shift the academic discussion from normative
argument to empirical assessment, and to advance a more nuanced thesis,
skeptical, but not wholly dismissive, of the Court’s reasoning. These are
crucial points that have been largely overlooked by the existing literature.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Jerry Mashaw has described accountability as “a protean concept, a
placeholder for multiple contemporary anxieties.”34 Similarly, Jane Schacter
has observed that “[a]ccountability is . . . strikingly undertheorized” and
implored “scholars [to] focus more precisely on the meaning of

32
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462–64 (2003); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty,
and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998).
33
See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability,
and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH : THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 46 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006);
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2009).
34
Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 115 (Michael
W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
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accountability.”35 I concur both that accountability is often conflated with
other ideas and that it is important to define it as carefully as possible. In this
Part, I therefore concentrate on definitional matters, reserving my critique of
the Court’s accountability claims for the balance of the Article.
I begin by specifying the electoral form of accountability that is my
subject here. Electoral accountability exists when voters reward elected
officials for good records by voting for them, and punish officials for bad
records by voting against them. It relies on the mechanism of retrospective
voting, which in turn makes a series of demands of voters: that they know
about incumbents’ records, that they form judgments about these records,
that they attribute responsibility for the records, and that they vote based on
these judgments and attributions. Next, I compare electoral accountability to
other variants—managerial, legal, professional, and so on—that are beyond
this Article’s scope. Lastly, I distinguish retrospective voting from other
ways in which voters may choose to cast their ballots: prospectively,
spatially, demographically, and the like. These other voting modes are very
much this Article’s business because, to the extent they are employed,
retrospective voting is not.
A. Retrospective Voting
Accountability is, at its core, a relational concept. It contemplates two
parties, one of whom acts on the other’s behalf.36 It also requires that the
party on whose behalf the other party acts be able to reward the acting party
for good performance and punish it for bad performance. In this way, the
acting party can be held accountable for its actions by the party for whom
the actions are taken. As James Fearon has put it,
We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are
met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on

35

Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Beyond,
2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2–3 (2002); see also RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO
ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (2003) (describing accountability as “highly
controversial,” “the subject of considerable political conflict,” and “unclear and contested”); M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1180 (2000)
(“Commentators uniformly praise [accountability]. Unfortunately, it is not exactly clear what they are
praising.”).
36
These parties can be specified in economic terms: the principal on whose behalf the agent acts.
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185,
185–86 (2014). But see Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 32 (2005) (pointing out some limits of the principal-agent
model when applied to political representation).

999

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
behalf of B. Second, B is empowered . . . to sanction or reward A for her
activities or performance in this capacity.37

With this general definition in mind, it is easy to identify the distinctive
aspects of electoral accountability. Voters are the ones on whose behalf
actions are taken. Elected officials are the ones who take these actions. And
the ballot is the indispensable tool that voters use to hold officeholders
accountable. Voters vote for incumbents whose records they approve of, and
against incumbents whose records they dislike.38
In the literature on electoral accountability, voters are typically thought
to hold elected officials accountable for overall policy outcomes: poverty or
prosperity, crime or safety, war or peace, and so on.39 But there is no reason
why officeholders cannot also be held accountable for their specific policy
stances—or for anything else, for that matter. Voters are sovereign actors,
and it is their prerogative to appraise incumbents’ records as they wish.40 The
literature also tends to stress voting to the exclusion of all other steps that
voters might take.41 But while the ballot is the essential device through which
37
James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types
Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55,
55 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); see also, e.g., Rubin, supra note 33, at 2073 (“Accountability can
be roughly defined as the ability of one actor . . . to reward or punish [a] second actor on the basis of its
performance or its explanation.”). Other scholars define accountability in more elaborate terms,
highlighting each aspect of the relationship between the parties. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 63 (2001) (defining accountability in terms of four questions: “Who will
decide what results are to be produced?,” “Who is accountable for producing these results?,” “Who is
responsible for implementing the accountability process?,” and “How will that accountability process
work?”); Mashaw, supra note 34, at 118 (considering “who is liable or accountable to whom; what they
are liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what
standards the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding
that those standards have been breached”).
38
For similar conceptions of electoral accountability, see Bernard Manin et al., Elections and
Representation, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 37, at 40
(“Governments are ‘accountable’ if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest
and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interest of citizens win
reelection and those who do not lose them.”); David Samuels, Presidentialism and Accountability for the
Economy in Comparative Perspective, 98 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 425, 426 (2004) (“[E]lectoral accountability
occurs because voters retrospectively judge whether governments have acted in their best interests and
then reward or sanction them appropriately.”).
39
See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 8
(1981) (“The traditional theory of retrospective voting implicitly assumes that citizens are more
concerned about actual outcomes than about the particular means of achieving those outcomes, that
citizens care about results rather than the policies that produce those results . . . .”).
40
E.g., Paul M. Sniderman et al., Information and Electoral Choice, in INFORMATION AND
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 117, 118 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Voters may
focus on many or few aspects of the incumbent’s record, interpreting the notion of a record broadly or
narrowly.”).
41
See, e.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Does Economics Still Matter? Econometrics and the Vote, 68 J.
POL. 208, 208 (2006) (commenting that while “[i]n this literature, there are two standard dependent
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voters reward or punish elected officials, voter approval serves a similar
function in periods before and after elections. Officeholders with high
approval ratings usually govern more effectively than their less popular
peers.42
Its proponents deem electoral accountability desirable for two
complementary reasons. First, it enables voters to oust elected officials who
have performed poorly. The quality of governance presumably improves
when these officials are removed from office.43 Second, it incentivizes
incumbents to produce strong records so they will not lose their reelection
bids. Incumbents know they will be judged based on how they have done,
and thus are motivated to do well. This motivation, of course, is exactly what
voters want from their representatives.44
Scholars frequently confuse electoral accountability with other
democratic values,45 but their meanings are distinct. For instance,
accountability is not synonymous with the holding of free and fair elections.
If voters do not vote retrospectively, then these elections do not result in
accountability. Likewise, elected officials can be accountable to voters
without being responsive to their preferences. This situation arises if voters
do vote retrospectively—but based on criteria other than whether their
representatives share their views.46

variables, popularity or vote,” “vote is generally preferred because . . . ‘political behavior’ is ‘the ultimate
dependent variable in our theoretical scheme’”).
42
See Jeffrey E. Cohen & James D. King, Relative Unemployment and Gubernatorial Popularity,
66 J. POL. 1267, 1267 (2004) (“Job approval also provides a mechanism for the public to hold
[officeholders] accountable.”). Strictly speaking, accountability through voter approval is not electoral
accountability since it does not rely on the ballot.
43
See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 1034, 1049 (2004) (observing that electoral accountability “allows voters to remove
officials whose interests appear to be noncongruent with the electorate”).
44
See, e.g., Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 189 (“[B]ecause an incumbent agent knows that
her principals will assess her fitness for continuation in office (or other rewards) based on her
performance, she will make better choices than she would otherwise.”).
45
E.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 533 (conflating “political accountability” with “the requirement that
public officials stand periodically for election”); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political
Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615 (2002) (conflating “accountability” with “responsiveness”);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008)
(treating “the closely related concepts of political accountability and political representativeness as
synonymous”).
46
See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 322 n.160 (“[V]oters may well want to hold
representatives accountable for more than their voting records. Constituent service, seniority, good
character, and many other factors also may play into voters’ decisions.”).
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As this discussion suggests, retrospective voting is the key prerequisite
for electoral accountability.47 Retrospective voting is simply voting based on
the records accrued by incumbents while in office. If these records are strong,
voters cast their ballots for the incumbents; if they are weak, voters throw
their support to the challengers.48 Retrospective voting, in turn, occurs only
if four conditions are satisfied. These conditions are necessary and sufficient,
meaning that if they are present, retrospective voting and electoral
accountability ensue, but if they are absent, these values cannot be realized.49
First, voters must know about incumbents’ records while in office.
(Again, records can mean overall policy outcomes, specific policy stances,
or any other aspects of prior performance that voters deem relevant.50)
Retrospective knowledge is what makes retrospective voting possible in the
first place; without it, voters lack the necessary information to cast their
ballots based on past developments.51 And actual knowledge is generally
required, not mere reliance on informational cues or shortcuts.52 Partisan
affiliation, for example, is a valuable prompt for other types of voting, but it
does not tell voters, specifically, what incumbents have done. Likewise,
interest group endorsements can substitute for actual knowledge only to the
extent they are based on prior events rather than prospective factors.
Second, voters must form judgments about officeholders’ records. In
other words, they must appraise the records and decide whether, in their
view, the records are strong or weak. This appraisal is ultimately subjective,
as there is no intrinsically right or wrong way to evaluate officeholders’
performances. However, the more detached the appraisal is from objective
indicators, the more erratic (and the less attractive) retrospective voting
becomes. In the extreme case, if voters’ assessments are entirely unrelated to

47

See, e.g., Seok-ju Cho, Retrospective Voting and Political Representation, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 276,
276 (2009) (“The classic idea of accountability is related to retrospective voting: voters reject a badly
behaved incumbent and retain a well-behaved one.”).
48
See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 39, at 6–11; James E. Campbell et al., The Theory of Conditional
Retrospective Voting: Does the Presidential Record Matter Less in Open-Seat Elections?, 72 J. POL.
1083, 1083 (2010) (“The theory of retrospective voting is that voters base their votes on their perceptions
of the past performance of the parties and candidates in governing.”).
49
For similar lists of conditions for retrospective voting, see Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2004), and Staszewski, supra note 33, at 1266.
50
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999) (“Before the public can hold elected
representatives responsible for decisions, they must know the substance of the policy adopted.”).
52
See, e.g., Somin, supra note 49, at 1320 (“[I]nformation shortcuts, while certainly useful, cannot
provide an adequate substitute for basic factual knowledge about politics.”).
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real-world evidence, this evidence loses its ability to drive voters’
decisions.53
Third, voters must attribute responsibility for the records. That is, they
must determine whom to credit or blame for the performances they have
observed and appraised. Accurate attribution is easy when the records at
issue are incumbents’ own policy stances. Plainly, incumbents are
responsible for the positions they have chosen to take. But correct attribution
is more difficult when the relevant records are overall policy outcomes. In
this case, voters must decide how much credit or blame each elected official
is due for conditions that are partly the government’s doing and partly the
product of many other factors.54
And fourth, voters must actually vote on the basis of their judgments
and attributions. They must support officeholders whom they credit for
outcomes they regard as good, and oppose officeholders whom they blame
for results they see as bad. Similarly, they must vote for incumbents whose
policy stances they favor, and against incumbents whose positions they
dislike. Only in this way do the earlier stages in the causal sequence
ultimately bear fruit. If voters take the trouble to learn, to appraise, and to
attribute—but then cast their ballots on other grounds—there is no
retrospective voting, and hence no electoral accountability.55
As this analysis is fairly abstract, a graphical illustration may be helpful.
Take the state of the economy, which is by far the most studied variable in

53
See, e.g., Christopher J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting?: Contingency Dilemmas and the
Limits of Democratic Accountability, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 271, 279 (2007) (observing that in most
models of retrospective voting, “the translation process requires that this objective economy is perceived
by voters and perceived somewhat accurately”).
54
See, e.g., Thomas J. Rudolph, The Meaning and Measurement of Responsibility Attributions,
44 AM. POL. RES. 106, 107 (2016) (explaining that “attributional judgments in politics are comprised of
two complementary but distinct considerations,” namely “how much responsibility does an actor or
institution bear for a particular outcome” and “[h]ow much responsibility does an actor bear . . . compared
with other relevant actors”). Note that by requiring reasonable evaluations of incumbents’ records and
accurate attributions of responsibility for them, I am articulating requirements for a normatively
appealing form of retrospective voting. A distorted form of retrospective voting occurs if voters
unreasonably assess incumbents’ records or incorrectly assign responsibility for them.
55
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 53, at 279 (pointing out that “[t]he next step in the chain of
necessary events,” “that these evaluations translate into a vote for or against the government,” is not
always satisfied). My inclusion of this fourth condition means I am deliberately conflating the possibility
of accountability (captured by the first three conditions) with its reality. Officeholders may be held
accountable if the first three conditions are satisfied, while they are held accountable if the fourth
condition is met as well. Though the Supreme Court’s language is hard to parse, see infra Part II, it is
plausible that some of its claims involve potential rather than actual accountability. To the extent the
claims are construed this way, only evidence about the first three conditions is relevant to them. It is
immaterial, on this account, whether voters in fact choose to vote retrospectively and thus to hold
officeholders to account.
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the accountability literature.56 Assume also that voters (1) are accurately
informed about this state, (2) assess the state reasonably (so that a good
economy produces a good evaluation and vice versa), (3) attribute
responsibility for the state to the President, and (4) vote on this basis. Then,
as shown in Figure 1, Scenario 1, there is a strong and steeply sloped
relationship between voters’ appraisal of the economy and the probability
they will vote for the President. This relationship reveals that the President
is highly accountable for the economy’s condition. When it is weak, voters
are much less likely to vote for her. But when it is strong, she is much more
apt to win their support.
Now assume that while voters still know about the economy’s state and
assess it reasonably, they attribute responsibility for it to the vagaries of the
stock market, not the President. (This means the third condition for
retrospective voting is not satisfied, but the point holds no matter which
criterion is unmet.) In this case, displayed in Figure 1, Scenario 2, there is a
weak and flat relationship between voters’ appraisal of the economy and the
probability they will vote for the President. This link indicates that the
President is mostly unaccountable for the economy’s condition. As it varies
from weak to strong, voters become only slightly more likely to cast their
ballots for her.
Figure 1 can be generalized beyond this example, of course. The y-axis
can represent any kind of support that voters might give to incumbents: not
just their votes but also their dollars, their time, or their positive responses to
opinion surveys.57 Likewise, the x-axis can capture voters’ evaluations of any
aspects of incumbents’ records, or even the records themselves. And the
curves that plot the relationships between voters’ support and their
evaluations can depict the impact of almost anything on accountability:
levels of voter knowledge, types of institutional arrangements, modes of
voting, and so on. Again, a steeper slope is the telltale sign of higher
accountability, while a flatter line denotes the opposite.58

56
See, e.g., Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to
Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120, 121 (2008) (noting that “economic performance” is “the focus of
almost every other study on [retrospective voting]”).
57
And even with respect to votes, the y-axis can represent voters’ own voting intentions, the
incumbent party’s vote share, that party’s seat share, or whether that party remains in control of the
government. See David Samuels & Timothy Hellwig, Elections and Accountability for the Economy: A
Conceptual and Empirical Reassessment, 20 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 393, 396 (2010)
(pointing out “the range of observable measures of electoral accountability”).
58
In slightly more technical terms, suppose we are interested in determining the effect of some
variable on accountability. The key is to interact this variable with voters’ evaluations, in a model in
which voters’ support is the dependent variable. The coefficient of the interaction term then reveals the
variable’s impact on accountability. See, e.g., Robert Johns, Credit Where It’s Due?: Valence Politics,
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FIGURE 1: PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE ECONOMY

B. Other Forms of Accountability
Some of these extensions of Figure 1 start to implicate non-electoral
forms of accountability. For instance, voters’ approval of officeholders is
closely related to their voting for officeholders, but it is not the same thing.
Voters can express approval (or disapproval) at any time, not just when an
election is held. Voters’ sentiments also have less drastic consequences for
incumbents than actual election results. The former merely enhance or
undermine incumbents’ effectiveness, while the latter either keep them in
office or oust them from it.59
Other voter actions that reward (or punish) officeholders, like
contributing (or not contributing) money to them or joining (or not joining)
their campaigns, are even further removed from the ballot. Crucially, all
voters vote, by definition, and can express their feelings in surveys, but only
a small subset donate their funds or time to candidates.60 Nevertheless, it is
Attributions of Responsibility, and Multi-Level Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 53, 68 (2011) (commenting
that “[t]his is the stock approach to inferring the relevance of an issue in vote choice”).
59
See, e.g., Samuels & Hellwig, supra note 57, at 395 (noting that “[p]oliticians might take note of
the general thrust of voters’ expressed opinion, but they also might ignore these signals altogether”).
60
For a discussion of the unrepresentativeness of campaign donors, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1474–75 (2015).
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perfectly coherent to speak of incumbents’ accountability to donors or to
activists. These are simply non-electoral kinds of accountability, through
acts other than voting, to certain groups of voters rather than the electorate
as a whole.61
Many elected officials are also accountable to other politicians. Within
parties’ legislative caucuses, in particular, rank-and-file members are
rewarded by their leadership for good behavior (like toeing the party line)
and punished for bad conduct (like undercutting party unity) through
committee assignments, campaign contributions, and other tools.62 This sort
of managerial accountability is even more important for unelected public
officials—that is, bureaucrats. Bureaucracies are hierarchical organizations
in which inferiors are accountable in many ways to their superiors for their
records. Supervisors can praise or criticize their subordinates, give them
better or worse work, promote or demote them, and so on. As Edward Rubin
has observed, this is a much richer array of accountability devices than the
ballot to which voters are limited.63
Still another variant worth noting is legal accountability. This is the
accountability of officeholders (and everybody else) not to a concrete
counterparty but rather to the law itself. Officeholders (and all other persons)
are subject to fines, imprisonment, and other penalties when they transgress
legal norms. In the words of Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, “agents [must]
abide by formal rules and be prepared to justify their actions in those terms,
in courts or quasi-judicial arenas.”64
More could be said about these non-electoral types of accountability,
which raise many interesting issues. But I flag these types only to bracket
them. Almost all of the Supreme Court’s claims involve accountability via
voting rather than through any other mechanism.65 I therefore turn next from
61
See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 35, at 10 (discussing officeholders’ accountability to groups that
can offer “substantial campaign contributions . . . and other political resources”).
62
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 34, at 121 (observing that “political accountability includes . . . a
host of other political processes in which elected officials hold their fellows . . . accountable for their
actions based on essentially political criteria”).
63
See Rubin, supra note 33, at 2134 (discussing “how fully the concept of accountability is tied into
an administrative hierarchy and requires the sort of continuous, intensive interaction between superior
and subordinate that is characteristic of this hierarchy”); see also BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 209 (3d ed. 1998) (covering “an awesome armada of
policies, mechanisms, and processes for overseeing government bureaucracies”).
64
Grant & Keohane, supra note 36, at 36; see also Helene V. Smookler, Accountability of Public
Officials in the United States, in PUBLIC SERVICE ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39,
41 (Joseph G. Jabbra & O.P. Dwivedi eds., 1989) (“[A]gencies are also legally accountable to the courts
for the administrative observance of statutes and constitutionally granted rights and liberties . . . .”).
65
A handful of Court decisions address interbranch rather than electoral accountability. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 773 (1982) (discussing impeachment as a form of “accountability to
the other branches”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the
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alternatives to electoral accountability to alternatives to retrospective voting.
These other voting modes are highly relevant here because the more they are
used, the less persuasive the Court’s claims become.
C. Other Forms of Voting
Prospective voting—voting based on candidates’ expected future
records66—is the obvious antithesis of retrospective voting. Prospective
voting differs starkly from retrospective voting in its orientation toward the
future rather than the past. More subtly, it differs in the demands it makes of
voters. It requires them to assess all candidates, not just the incumbent,
before choosing for whom to cast their ballots.67 These contrasts, though,
should not be overstated. As Morris Fiorina has explained, voters’
evaluations of incumbents’ past records are key drivers of their expectations
of incumbents’ future performances.68 Prospective voting is thus intertwined,
at least partly, with retrospective voting.
Closely tied to prospective voting is spatial voting, or voting for the
most ideologically proximate candidate. To vote in this way, a voter must
first ascertain her own ideology as well as those of all candidates in the race,
typically on a single left-right continuum. The voter must then vote for the
candidate who is ideologically closest to her own position. Spatial voting
resembles prospective voting in its future orientation and consideration of all
candidates. It is distinct, though, in its exclusive focus on ideological
distance. This may be one of the factors that a prospective voter takes into
account, but it is the entirety of the decision-making process for a spatial
voter.69
Another, even simpler approach in the same family is partisan voting,
or voting for the candidate who shares the voter’s partisan affiliation. This
approach, the so-called “Michigan model” of voting, is based on the
legislative veto as a tool through which “Congress secures the accountability of executive and
independent agencies”).
66
As in the retrospective voting context, records can refer to overall policy outcomes, specific policy
stances, or any other aspects of candidate performance that voters deem relevant. See supra notes 39–40
and accompanying text.
67
See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1083 (“Unlike prospective voting, which requires the
electorate to know, evaluate, and contrast the sometimes complex or ambiguous positions of the parties
and candidates, retrospective voting requires relatively little of voters.”).
68
See FIORINA, supra note 39, at 200 (“Retrospective judgments have direct impacts on the formation
of future expectations and on party identification, and through these factors, indirect influences on the
vote.”).
69
For illuminating discussions of spatial voting, see Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004
Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 59, 59–63 (2009), and Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski,
Ideology and the US Congressional Vote, POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 1, 1–19 (2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2650028 [https://perma.cc/V9NL-AGQK].
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centrality of partisanship for many voters.70 Partisanship, on this account, is
the “unmoved mover” that enables voters to make sense of a complicated
political world and to feel as if they are part of a political team.71 To be sure,
Michigan modelers acknowledge that partisan affiliation can change over
time as voters update their “running tally” of parties’ successes and failures.72
Nevertheless, these scholars view partisan affiliation as a highly durable
attribute that, in most circumstances, translates directly into votes.
Still another mode of voting might be termed demographic: voting for
the candidate who shares the voter’s race, ethnicity, gender, or other defining
characteristic. Demographic voting underpins the Supreme Court’s case law
construing the Voting Rights Act; racial cohesion must be shown, for both
minority and majority voters, to establish a violation of the Act.73 In the
Court’s view, demographic voting is also quite common: “Because both
minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their
preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black candidate
is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites.”74
A final option is valence voting based on candidate qualities that are
intrinsically appealing but unrelated to public policy. These valence qualities
include good looks, charisma, a winning personality, and the like. When
voters cast their ballots in reliance on these qualities, they disregard
ideological and partisan factors. Instead, their choices are driven by the
degree to which candidates exhibit personal traits that voters find attractive.75
Again, the key point about these voting modes is that they are
fundamentally different from retrospective voting based on incumbents’
records. When voters vote in these ways, their attention is not on the past
alone and extends to all candidates in the race. Arguments built on the
assumption of retrospective voting thus founder to the extent this premise
fails to capture actual voter behavior. It should also be stressed that the voting
modes are not exclusive. That is, voters do not vote in one way, in perfect
70

The definitive work setting forth this approach remains ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN
VOTER (Midway reprt. 1980). Cf. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Presidential
Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI . 409, 419
(1993) (referring to “the social-psychological models connected with the Michigan School”).
71
MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 134–36 (2008).
72
FIORINA, supra note 39, at 85–86.
73
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (requiring showings that “the minority group . . .
is politically cohesive” and that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc”).
74
Id. at 68. In the political science literature, the canonical work on demographic voting, which gave
rise to the so-called “Columbia model,” is PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW
THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2d ed. 1948).
75
For a good discussion of valence voting, distinguishing between “character valence” and
“campaign valence” traits, see Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological
Positions in U.S. House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 371–74 (2010).
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consistency with a single theory of voting, but rather for a messy mix of
reasons that stem from multiple models at once.76 It is therefore unlikely that
retrospective voting plays no role in voters’ decision-making. Instead, the
crucial question is how much of a role it plays—how its influence compares
to those of other forms of voting. That is one of the issues I address below in
the Article’s empirical section.77
II. ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE COURT
Before getting to the empirics, though, I pinpoint the claims about
electoral accountability made by the Supreme Court. These claims involve
four distinct issues: (1) the President’s degree of control over administrative
agencies, (2) the degree of congressional delegation to agencies, (3) the
extent to which state governments are commandeered by the federal
government, and (4) the amount of money in politics. The first three of the
claims apply primarily to the third condition for retrospective voting: voters’
attribution of responsibility for incumbents’ records. In contrast, the
campaign finance claim relates mostly to the first condition: voters’
knowledge of these records.
I note that I consider accountability claims in opinions both by Court
majorities and by individual Justices (though I prioritize the former over the
latter). I also note that I cover only what I deem to be the most common
accountability claims in the case law. I do not comment on certain one-off
arguments made by individual Justices,78 nor do I evaluate assertions that
particular doctrinal rules are required by particular actors’ greater or lesser
accountability.79 A last proviso: In all of the cases I examine, the Court
76

See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 35, at 14 (doubting that “we could persuasively conceive of elections
as all selection or all sanction” and suggesting that “[p]erhaps some combination of selection and sanction
characterize [sic] most elections”).
77
See infra Part III.
78
See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (claiming that accountability is diminished “by passing off a Government operation [Amtrak]
as an independent private concern”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 361 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(claiming that accountability is diminished when, due to partisan gerrymandering, “voters find it far more
difficult to remove those responsible for a government they do not want”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
531 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (claiming that accountability is diminished when political patronage
is prohibited because its ban weakens parties and so “limits the ability of the electorate to choose wisely
among candidates”).
79
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (justifying
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes on the ground that “[w]hile agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(justifying judicial deference to changes in agency policies on the ground that “people casting their votes
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations”). These are assertions about what doctrinal consequences should follow if
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justifies its conclusions partly on the basis of its accountability claims and
partly on other grounds. These other grounds are beyond the scope of this
project, and so are omitted from the discussion that follows.
A. The President
Beginning with the President, the Court contends that she is more
electorally accountable for an agency’s actions when she exercises more
control over the agency. The removal power—the President’s authority to
dismiss an agency official—is the principal method of control addressed by
the Court’s decisions. The same logic, though, applies to other means of
control such as the appointment power (the President’s authority to select
agency staff)80 and the directive power (the President’s authority to instruct
them what to do).81 Under this logic, restrictions on the President’s control
over an agency are disfavored because they reduce the President’s
accountability for the agency’s actions. In fact, such restrictions are
sometimes unconstitutional, a violation of the democratic principles
embodied in the separation of powers.
The Court articulated this claim most clearly in the 2010 case of Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.82 At issue
was a two-level protection from removal for the members of the Board, an
entity created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.83 The Board members
could be dismissed only for good cause by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commissioners, in turn, could be dismissed only for
good cause by the President.84 Two layers of removal restrictions thus
separated the President from the Board members.85
According to the Court, this arrangement unlawfully eroded the
President’s accountability for the Board’s actions. The dual removal
restraints broke the “clear and effective chain of command” and the “‘chain
of dependence’” on which voters rely to “determine on whom the blame or

certain actors are more or less accountable. They are not claims about what increases or decreases
accountability in the first place.
80
See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing that if the President “has no control over the
appointment of inferior officers,” she “may have less incentive to care about such appointments”).
81
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2298–99 (2001)
(noting that President Bill Clinton’s more extensive use of the directive power changed “norms of
accountability”).
82
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
83
Id. at 484.
84
Id. at 486–87.
85
See id. at 484, 486–87.
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the punishment [for] a pernicious measure . . . ought really to fall.”86 The
restraints therefore “subvert[ed] . . . the public’s ability to pass judgment on
[the President’s] efforts” and rendered the President “not . . . fully
accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.”87 Now “the buck
would stop somewhere else,” “greatly diminish[ing] the intended and
necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate.”88
Justice Antonin Scalia made the same argument in his renowned 1988
dissent in Morrison v. Olson.89 He commented that, ordinarily, when the
President can dismiss federal prosecutors at will, “the President pays the cost
in political damage to his administration” if prosecutors abuse their
authority.90 “[T]he unfairness” of the prosecutors’ conduct “will come home
to roost in the Oval Office.”91 However, a provision limiting to good cause
the Attorney General’s ability to remove an independent counsel meant that
“a process is set in motion that is not in the full control of persons ‘dependent
on the people,’ and whose flaws cannot be blamed on the President.”92
“[E]ven if it were entirely evident” that the counsel had behaved badly,
“there would be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could
be assigned.”93
More implicitly, in cases not involving restrictions on the President’s
removal power, Justices have assumed that the President wields more (less)
control over executive (independent) agencies, and so is more (less)
accountable for their actions. In a 1991 case, the Court stated that “Cabinetlevel departments” are “subject to the exercise of political oversight” by the
President, and thus “share the President’s accountability to the people.”94 In
a 2000 dissent, similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that “politically
elected officials . . . must (and will)” be held “politically accountable” for
“important, conspicuous, and controversial” decisions by the Food and Drug
Administration (an executive agency).95 Conversely, Justice Breyer asserted
86
Id. at 498 (citation omitted); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 131–32 (1926) (also
discussing this “‘chain of dependence’” and asking, if the President cannot remove a subordinate at will,
“where is the responsibility?”).
87
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498, 514 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 476 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
88
Id. at 514 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 478).
89
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
90
Id. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 729; see also id. at 729, 731 (stating that “[t]he people know whom to blame” and “the blame
can be assigned to someone who can be punished” when prosecutors are removable at will by the
President).
92
Id. at 729.
93
Id. at 731 (emphasis omitted).
94
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991).
95
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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in 2009 that the Federal Communications Commission (an independent
agency) is “insulate[d] . . . from ‘the exercise of political oversight,’” is “not
directly responsible to the voters,” and so possesses a “comparative freedom
from ballot-box control.”96 Likewise, Justice Scalia opined in 1991 that the
“congressional restriction upon arbitrary dismissal of the heads of
[independent] agencies” makes “such agencies less accountable to [the
President], and hence he less responsible for them.”97
This claim—that the President’s accountability for an agency’s actions
stems from her control over the agency—is based on voters’ attributions of
responsibility. The idea is that the more control the President actually has
over an agency, the more control she is perceived as having. Voters therefore
become more likely to credit the President for agency actions they support,
and to blame her for agency actions they oppose, as her sway over the agency
rises. In contrast, voters are less apt to see the President as responsible for
the policies of an agency that is further outside her influence. As Alex Ruder
has summarized the argument, “presidential control over agencies promotes
the value of greater political accountability by increasing institutional clarity
of responsibility.”98
But while the third condition for retrospective voting is the one most
directly implicated here, it is important to recognize that the Court’s claim
also depends on the satisfaction of the other criteria. The President cannot be
held accountable for agency actions that voters do not know about. Nor can
she be held accountable for actions as to which voters have reached no
normative judgments. And nor is there presidential accountability if voters
ultimately cast their ballots on grounds other than their judgments of, and
attributions for, agency policies. These are simply the implications of the
retrospective voting conditions being necessary and sufficient. If any of them
is unmet, voters do not vote retrospectively and the President is neither
rewarded nor punished for agency performance.99
It is also necessary to acknowledge that the Court sometimes phrases
its claim in a subtly—but substantively—different way. Under this variant,
the point is not that greater presidential control over an agency produces
greater presidential accountability. Rather, it is that because the President is
96

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
98
Alex I. Ruder, Institutional Design and the Attribution of Presidential Control: Insulating the
President from Blame, 9 Q.J. POL. SCI . 301, 331 (2014); see also Kagan, supra note 81, at 2323 n.306
(“[I]f the President can remove an official, the public will hold him accountable for that official’s
decisions.”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1133, 1149 (2014) (“[A] unitary executive removes some ambiguity surrounding the ‘author’ of the
administrative actions . . . and hence allows [voters] to reward or punish government performance.”).
99
See supra Section I.A.
97
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elected by voters, and thus accountable to them, she should have plenary
authority over the entire executive branch.100 Stated like this, the argument is
above all one about democratic legitimacy, not about the drivers of
presidential accountability. In this form, the argument also cannot be
empirically validated or refuted; plainly, the President is elected, agency
officials are not, and certain normative conclusions may or may not follow
from these facts.101 Because my subject here is the empirical (not the
normative) soundness of the Court’s reasoning, I do not further discuss this
version of the claim. Its cogency does not hinge on any of the political
science evidence I present below.
B. Congress
Moving from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other, certain
Justices maintain that Congress is more electorally accountable for decisions
it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself. When agencies act
pursuant to congressional authorization, these Justices believe that voters are
unlikely to reward or punish legislators for the actions. But when the actions
are taken directly by Congress, in these Justices’ view, they are more apt to
result in political gains or losses for legislators. This alleged rise in
accountability is one reason why the nondelegation doctrine nominally
remains good law, in theory barring Congress from assigning certain policy
choices to agencies.
Then-Justice William Rehnquist asserted this claim most forcefully in
a 1980 case involving the setting of a benzene exposure limit by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.102 He wrote that “the
nondelegation doctrine serves three important functions,” one of which is
that “it ensures . . . that important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
100
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)
(“The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives
him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those who assist
him in carrying out his duties.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) (arguing that because
“the President [is] elected by all the people,” “there would seem to be no reason for construing [the
Constitution] in such a way as to limit and hamper [the President’s executive] power”). Still another
variant of the claim (which I also do not address) is that when the President has less control over an
agency, the agency is less managerially accountable to the President. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at
496 (commenting that the President’s “ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates
accountable for their conduct—is impaired” by the dual removal restraints).
101
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case
of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 196 (1995) (“[I]f one simply defines
‘accountability’ as the vesting of ultimate decisional authority in a person who is elected, not appointed,
it is, indeed, self-evident that the President is elected, and bureaucrats are not.”).
102
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980).
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will,” not by “politically unresponsive administrators.”103 He added that “[i]t
is the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which must be made
by the elected representatives of the people.”104 “When fundamental policy
decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be
made, the buck stops with Congress . . . .”105
Justice John Marshall Harlan echoed this argument in a 1963 opinion,
stating that the nondelegation doctrine “insures that the fundamental policy
decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the
body immediately responsible to the people.”106 So did Justice William J.
Brennan in a 1967 concurrence, commenting that, “to the extent Congress
delegates authority under indefinite standards, [its] policy-making function
is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive in the same
degree to the people.”107 And so did a Court majority in 1996, declaring that
through its “clear assignment of power to [Congress],” the nondelegation
doctrine “allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for
making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to
governance.”108
This claim about congressional accountability, like its presidential
analogue, centers on voters’ attributions of responsibility. Its crux is that
when Congress authorizes agencies to decide matters, voters are less likely
to deem legislators responsible for the ensuing decisions. Those decisions
tend to strike voters as the handiwork of agencies, not of Congress.
Conversely, when Congress does not delegate but rather makes policy
choices itself, voters are more inclined to credit or blame legislators. Those
choices cannot reasonably be attributed to any other actor. As David
Schoenbrod has written, “when Congress delegates, its fingerprints are not
103

Id. at 685–87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 687.
105
Id.
106
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
107
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
108
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996). The idea that Congress is more accountable
for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself also helps justify the so-called
“nondelegation canon,” under which courts construe ambiguous statutes so as to preclude agency
authority to make sweeping policy choices. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015);
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (“[W]e are confident that
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to
an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 329–37.
Additionally, concerns about diminished congressional accountability due to delegation are
sometimes answered by pointing out that the popularly elected President is responsible for the agencies
to whom authority has been assigned. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when Congress delegates to agencies, it “aggrandize[s] its primary
competitor for political power, and the recipient of the policymaking authority, while not Congress itself,
would at least be politically accountable”).
104
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left on the duties imposed on the public,” and it “obscure[s] [its]
responsibility for the eventual costs and disappointments.”109
Also like the presidential claim, the congressional argument requires
the rest of the conditions for retrospective voting to be satisfied too. Even if
legislators make the hard decisions themselves, they can be held accountable
for those decisions only if voters know about them, appraise them, and cast
their ballots accordingly. And again as with the presidential claim, there exist
both empirical and normative forms of the congressional argument. The
empirical variant—the one that is my concern here—is that congressional
delegation to agencies reduces congressional accountability. The normative
variant is that Congress, not agencies, should make policy choices because
Congress, not agencies, is elected by the people.110 As before, I bracket this
assertion because political science evidence cannot confirm or rebut it.
C. State Governments
Turning next to state governments, the Court contends that their
electoral accountability is lessened when they are compelled to act by the
federal government. According to the Court, state governments can usually
choose for themselves which policies to enact, and then can be held
accountable for those choices by their state electorates. But this salutary state
of affairs breaks down when federal authorities require state governments to
take certain steps. Then state governments risk being rewarded or punished
for decisions they did not actually make—and the federal government may
avoid accountability for decisions it did make. For this reason (among
others), federal commandeering of state governments is prohibited.
The Court set forth this claim at greatest length in the 1992 case, New
York v. United States, in which it announced the anti-commandeering
doctrine.111 A federal statute, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,
directed states to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated
within their borders.112 In the absence of such a law, “[w]here Congress

109
David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
731, 744 (1999); see also Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (2015) (arguing that “delegation may allow members
of Congress to avoid responsibility for difficult choices”).
110
For an example of an academic stating the normative argument, see Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097,
2141 (2004) (“Congress . . . is the most democratically accountable political institution; hence, if we want
policy made by actors accountable to the people, we should require that policy . . . be made by Congress
rather than by unelected administrators.”). The empirical variant was stated most clearly by the Court in
Loving. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
112
See id. at 149–54.
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encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments
remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people.”113 But “where the Federal Government compels
States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.”114 “[I]t may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”115
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the author of New York, defended the
same proposition in a 1982 case involving federal requirements imposed on
state utility commissions.116 Typically, “[c]itizens . . . understand that
legislative authority . . . includes the power to decide . . . which policies to
adopt,” and “hold their utility commissions accountable for the choices they
make.”117 “Congressional compulsion of state agencies,” however, “blurs the
lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs.”118 In a 1997 case
about a federal mandate that state law enforcement officers check handgun
buyers’ backgrounds, the Court reasoned along similar lines.119 “By forcing
state governments to [act],” the federal government puts them “in the
position of taking the blame for [the policy’s] burdensomeness and for its
defects.”120 “Under the present law . . . it will likely be the [state officer], not
some federal official, who will be blamed for any error . . . that causes a
purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.”121
Outside the commandeering context, the Court has asserted that
Congress may exercise its Spending Clause power in such a way that states
have no choice but to comply with its preferences, thus again eroding
accountability. In the 2012 blockbuster, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, both the plurality and the dissenters argued that
Congress’s threat to withhold all Medicaid funds from states that declined to
expand their Medicaid programs amounted to unlawful compulsion.122 The
plurality wrote that “[p]ermitting the Federal Government to force the States
to implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability
113

Id. at 168.
Id.
115
Id. at 169.
116
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775–97 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
117
Id. at 787.
118
Id.
119
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902–04 (1997).
120
Id. at 930.
121
Id.
122
567 U.S. 519, 541–42 (2012).
114
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key to our federal system.”123 “[W]hen the State has no choice, the Federal
Government can achieve its objectives without accountability.”124 Likewise,
the dissenters declared that “[w]hen Congress compels the States to do its
bidding, it blurs the lines of political accountability.”125
This claim, that state governments’ accountability declines when they
are forced to act (overtly or implicitly) by the federal government, both
converges on and diverges from the arguments discussed above. It is similar
to the presidential and congressional arguments in that it too revolves around
voters’ attributions of responsibility. The essence of the claim is that voters
correctly assign responsibility to state governments when these bodies are
not federally coerced, but become unsure whom to credit or blame when they
are effectively carrying out federal orders.126 The claim is also similar in that
it too relies on the satisfaction of the other conditions for retrospective
voting. Even if state governments are free from federal interference, they are
accountable for their decisions only if voters are aware of those decisions,
assess them, and vote on their basis.
However, the claim is different in that it does not stray from empirical
onto normative terrain. The Court does not assert that state governments,
rather than the federal government, should make policy choices because they
are popularly elected. Nor would such an assertion be sensible since the
federal government also enjoys the legitimacy of democratic election. The
claim is different as well in that it applies to two kinds of institutions: the
states and the federal government. Federal compulsion of state governments
supposedly undermines both state and federal accountability.127 Of these two
sides to the argument, I focus below on the state aspect. It is the one that is

123

Id. at 578 (plurality opinion).
Id.
125
Id. at 678 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). Justice Kennedy has also invoked
accountability in the related Commerce Clause context, contending that “[w]ere the Federal Government
to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern . . . the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201 (1998) (arguing that commandeering may cause voters to “hold state
officers politically accountable for a choice that was not theirs” or to “fail to hold federal officials
politically accountable for choices they do make”); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360–61 (2001) (“If the people cannot assign blame for an unpopular federal
policy, because the lines of political accountability are not transparent, then the national government
responsible for the policy has avoided internalizing the political costs of its actions.”).
127
For an unusual case involving state interference with federal accountability, see Cook v. Gralike,
531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing a ballot initiative requiring Congress
members’ opposition to term limits to be noted on the ballot because it “interfere[d] with the direct line
of accountability between the National Legislature and the people who elect it”).
124
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more prominent in the case law, more illuminated by the political science
evidence, and more distinct from the Court’s other contentions.128
D. Incumbents
The Court’s final claim about electoral accountability pertains to
incumbent politicians generally, not to any particular branch or level of
government. It is that when campaign expenditures are unregulated,
corporations, unions, and other groups are able to deploy more funds to
inform voters about incumbents’ records, thus rendering incumbents more
accountable. Conversely, when campaign spending is restricted, concerned
entities cannot convey as much information to voters about incumbents’
performances, meaning that voters cannot reward or punish incumbents as
effectively. This reasoning helps explain why expenditure limits are now
considered a violation of the First Amendment.
The Court voiced this claim in the landmark 2010 case, Citizens United
v. FEC, in which it struck down the federal prohibition on independent
expenditures by corporations and unions.129 The Court proclaimed that
“[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people.”130 The Court then listed the ways in
which “speech”—that is, campaign spending—allegedly promotes
accountability. It enables voters “to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus.”131 It also enhances “the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates”132 as well as the
“‘[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates.’”133 Accordingly, “political speech must prevail against laws that
would suppress it.”134
Justice Kennedy, the author of Citizens United, advanced the same
argument in a 1990 case involving a state ban on corporate expenditures.135
He wrote that the ban “prevents a nonprofit corporate speaker from using its

128

The state governmental claim also differs from the presidential and congressional arguments in
that it is really about the distortion, not the reduction, of state governmental accountability. If state
governments are deemed responsible for actions they were compelled to take, then they may well be held
accountable for those actions too. But objectively, they should not be held accountable for those actions
because they were not actually responsible for them.
129
558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
130
Id. at 339.
131
Id.
132
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976)).
133
Id. at 340 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
134
Id.
135
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990), rev’d, Citizens United,
558 U.S. 310.
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own funds to inform the voting public that a particular candidate has a good
or bad voting record.”136 The ban therefore eliminates one of the
“mechanisms for holding candidates accountable for the votes they cast” and
perpetuates the “lack of accountability [that] is one of the major concerns of
our time.”137 In a 2003 case, Justice Scalia objected to the prohibition that
was later invalidated in Citizens United on similar grounds.138 “[T]his
legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities
most capable of giving such criticism loud voice.”139 The law thus “mute[s]
criticism of [Congress members’] records and facilitate[s] [their]
reelection.”140
This claim—that limits on campaign spending reduce incumbents’
accountability—differs from the Court’s other assertions in that it does not
apply to a specific institution. More importantly, the claim differs in that it
primarily implicates the first condition for retrospective voting (voters’
information about incumbents’ records) rather than the third one (voters’
attributions of responsibility). The basic reason why campaign spending is
thought to influence accountability is that it informs voters about
incumbents’ performances. Advertisements, mailers, rallies, and all the other
items paid for by the spending educate voters about the choices made by
incumbents and those choices’ consequences.
It is worth noting, though, that depending on how they are deployed,
electoral outlays can affect the other retrospective voting criteria too.
Campaign funds can be used not just to inform voters about incumbents’
records but also to persuade them that the records are strong or weak.
Likewise, funds can be spent on linking incumbents to positive or negative
developments that occurred on their watch. Funds can be devoted as well to
convincing voters to cast their ballots retrospectively rather than on some
other basis. So while the key function of money in politics might be
informational, that is far from its only purpose.
*

*

*

136

Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
138
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
139
Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
140
Id. at 262. For a similar claim that campaign finance regulation benefits incumbents and harms
challengers, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072 (1996) (“Campaign finance reform measures . . . insulate the
political system from challenge by outsiders, and hinder the ability of challengers to compete on equal
terms with those already in power.”) (footnote omitted).
137
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In sum, the Supreme Court makes four kinds of claims about electoral
accountability: (1) that the President is more accountable for an agency’s
actions when she exercises more control over the agency, (2) that Congress
is more accountable for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather
makes itself, (3) that state governments are more accountable for their
policies when they are not compelled to enact them by the federal
government, and (4) that incumbents are more accountable for their records
when campaign spending is unregulated. As is evident, all of these claims
exhibit a common structure. Accountability is said to be higher under certain
institutional arrangements than under others. Accountability is also said to
be high (not higher but still low) under the Court’s preferred approach. And
for these accountability gains to materialize, each condition for retrospective
voting must be satisfied.
Thanks to their shared logic, the Court’s claims can all be depicted
graphically using a variant of the chart presented earlier. The x-axis now
represents voters’ appraisal of the relevant actor’s record: the President, a
member of Congress, a state government official, or a generic incumbent.141
The y-axis now denotes the likelihood that voters will support this actor.
According to the Court, as shown in Figure 2, Scenario 1, there is a strong
and steeply sloped relationship between the two variables if the President
exerts more control over agencies, Congress delegates fewer decisions to
agencies, state governments enact their own policies, or campaign
expenditures are unrestricted. But per the Court and Figure 2, Scenario 2,
this relationship becomes weak and flat if the President has less sway over
agencies, Congress assigns more choices to agencies, state governments are
forced to act by their federal overseers, or campaign spending is limited. In
other words, accountability is both high absolutely in Scenario 1 and higher
relative to Scenario 2.
This chart, though, gives the Court’s claims a patina of empiricism they
have not actually earned. It is striking, in fact, that in the many cases in which
the Court has made assertions about accountability, it has never backed these
assertions with any facts.142 Instead, the Court’s analysis has been highly
141

Voters’ appraisal of an incumbent’s record works well as the x-axis for the Court’s first three
claims because all of them primarily involve voters’ attributions of responsibility—the next of the
conditions for retrospective voting. But for the Court’s campaign finance claim, which mostly relates to
voters’ knowledge of an incumbent’s record, the objective record itself is a better choice for the x-axis.
Here the idea is that when voters know more about the record, thanks to higher campaign spending, there
is a steeper relationship between the record and voters’ likelihood of supporting the incumbent.
Conversely, when voters know less about the record, thanks to lower campaign spending, the relationship
between the record and voters’ behavior is flatter.
142
See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American
Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2015) (noting in the federalism context that “the Court’s political
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abstract and theoretical, “a matter of words rather than of evidence,” as Cass
Sunstein once quipped.143 The goal of the next Part, then, is to progress from
words to evidence—to subject the Court’s claims to rigorous empirical
scrutiny and see how they fare. To give away the ending, my conclusion is
that they do not fare well at all, at least in most circumstances.
FIGURE 2: ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE COURT
More presidential control
Less congressional delegation
No federal commandeering
No campaign finance limits

Less presidential control
More congressional delegation
Federal commandeering
Campaign finance limits

III. ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE
I carry out my empirical assessment in the same way (more or less)144
for all of the Supreme Court’s claims about electoral accountability. I first
partition each claim into four constituent pieces corresponding to the four
conditions for retrospective voting. For each condition, I then present the
political science evidence that refutes the Court’s reasoning, typically by
showing that the criterion is unmet even though it would have to be satisfied
for the Court to be correct. Lastly, I discuss the findings that partly redeem
accountability argument turns on a dubious empirical claim for which the Court has supplied no empirical
evidence”); Magill, supra note 35, at 1181 n.166 (observing in the separation of powers context that
“accountability rests on unproved empirical assumptions”).
143
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 326 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine).
144
The exception is the Court’s campaign finance claim, whose rebuttal requires a different
analytical structure. See infra Section III.D.
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the Court’s claims, at least for certain voters in certain settings. These
findings are why this Article discounts accountability as a constitutional
value but does not entirely dismiss it.
I concede at the outset that there is only a limited amount of direct
evidence about the Court’s claims.145 In future work, I plan to add to this
small stock. But here I have no choice but to highlight the vast body of
indirect evidence, drawing inferences from it about the validity of the
Court’s analysis. Why is the explicit proof so sparse? One reason is that few
surveys ask voters the right questions about their knowledge, judgments,
attributions, and modes of voting, in part because these queries are so
challenging that they “undermine rapport between interviewers and
interviewees.”146 Another explanation is that it is difficult to study
retrospective voting observationally since key aspects of voter psychology
cannot be gleaned from aggregate election results.147 And perhaps most
importantly, “the statistical literature examining” retrospective voting “has
focused almost exclusively on whether the incumbent party is rewarded for
economic performance or punished for unpopular wars.”148 There is far less
work on the subtler forms of accountability implicated by the Court’s claims.
A. The President
1. Voter Knowledge
To start, consider the Court’s argument that the President is more
electorally accountable for agency actions when she exerts more control over
the bodies.149 For this argument to hold, voters must know about the agency
conduct. If this first condition for retrospective voting is not fulfilled, voters
cannot appraise the agency actions, attribute responsibility for them, or vote
based on these appraisals and attributions. Unfortunately, I am unaware of
145
See Schacter, supra note 35, at 2 (“[W]hat is missing is a sustained, empirical analysis of the
political accountability that is offered to support claims . . . .”).
146
Stephen Earl Bennett, Trends in Americans’ Political Information, 1967-1987, 17 AM. POL. Q.
422, 424 (1989); see also, e.g., Martin Gilens, Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences,
95 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 379, 380 (2001) (“Survey questions that assess the level of general political
information are relatively uncommon, and items that assess policy-specific information are rare indeed.”).
147
See, e.g., Johns, supra note 58, at 61 (pointing out that observational analysis “based on aggregate
election results . . . is a highly indirect means of inferring the basis for voters’ decisions”); Alex I. Ruder,
Agency Design, the Mass Media, and the Blame for Agency Scandals, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 514,
515 (2015) (“One challenge facing observational studies . . . on responsibility attributions is controlling
and measuring the information that voters encounter . . . .”).
148
Lawrence W. Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, Evidence on the Importance of Spatial Voting Models in
Presidential Nominations and Elections, 123 PUB. CHOICE 439, 440 (2005); see also George C. Edwards
III et al., Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 108,
109 (1995) (“Issues, such as the economy and war, underlie virtually all studies . . . .”).
149
See supra Section II.A.
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any survey that has asked voters about their knowledge of agency regulations
or adjudications.150 However, all of the indirect evidence on this score
suggests that most voters know very little about most agency activity. The
first criterion for holding the President accountable for agency behavior,
then, is typically unmet.
In a useful study, Ruder tracked the New York Times’s coverage of
regulatory agencies. Most agencies, including significant ones like the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, received very little coverage: fewer than
fifty articles per year even mentioned each of them.151 Only a handful of
agencies earned more extensive attention, on the order of two hundred or
more annual articles each: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Reserve, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.152 And even
these figures paled compared to the coverage of other issues often thought to
be within the President’s purview. In the final year of Ruder’s study, 2007,
more than six thousand articles mentioned the Iraq or Afghanistan wars, and
almost nine thousand referred to the economy.153
The implication of this work—that voters tend to be uninformed about
agency actions because these actions are rarely reported by the media—is
confirmed by the available survey evidence. In what remains the definitive
examination of voter knowledge, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter
assembled all survey questions addressing some aspect of public information
over a sixty-year period.154 For the category of questions involving “people
and parties,” “fully 62 percent . . . were answered correctly by fewer than
half of those surveyed.”155 Similarly, Ilya Somin analyzed answers to the
2000 American National Election Study (ANES), the preeminent recurring
150
In their definitive study of voters’ political knowledge, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter
tallied approximately 200,000 survey questions over a sixty-year period. It appears that none of these
questions involved voters’ awareness of (as opposed to views on) agency actions. See MICHAEL X. DELLI
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104
(1996). Nor did I find any such queries when I examined questionnaires for the American National
Election Study, the General Social Survey, or the National Annenberg Election Survey—all prominent
political polls.
151
See Ruder, supra note 147, at 530 fig.2.
152
See id.
153
See id. at 528 (noting coverage range of 1987–2007). My Lexis searches produced 6,547 hits for
Iraq or Afghanistan and 8,930 hits for the economy.
154
DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 65–67.
155
Id. at 77–78. Likewise, “[m]ore than 60 percent of the items tapping knowledge of domestic
politics could not be answered by as many as half of those asked,” id. at 82, and “more than half of the
553 foreign affairs items could be answered by less than half the general public,” id. at 85–86.
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poll about voter behavior.156 He found that only about one-third of
respondents knew that the crime rate had fallen and that federal spending on
the poor had risen during President Clinton’s tenure, even though these were
“indisputably [some] of the most important political issues of the 1990s.”157
The 2012 ANES painted a similarly grim picture; fewer than 30% of
respondents knew that the economy had improved and that unemployment
had declined over the previous year.158
Thanks to findings like these, in Delli Carpini’s words, “[t]here is a
consensus that most citizens are politically uninformed.”159 Somin has
reached an even stronger conclusion: “The most important point established
in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the majority of
American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”160 That this
ignorance applies to presidents’ specific policy stances as well as general
economic conditions during their terms has been demonstrated by survey
evidence. That the ignorance further extends to agency actions has not been
shown, but cannot reasonably be doubted. The same voters who are unaware
of key presidential positions and vital economic indicators cannot plausibly
be expected to know about lower-salience agency regulations and
adjudications.161 Without such knowledge, though, these voters cannot vote
retrospectively based on agency performance.162
2. Voter Judgments
For the Court’s claim about presidential accountability to be valid, the
next requirement is that voters form judgments about agency actions. Unless
voters come to hold opinions about them, the actions cannot result in any

156

See Somin, supra note 49, at 1306–07.
Id. at 1315–16; see also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–46 (2013) (reporting similar statistics for the 2000–2014 period).
158
See AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, USER’S GUIDE AND CODEBOOK FOR THE ANES 2012 TIME
SERIES STUDY 325, 331 (2015).
159
Michael X. Delli Carpini, In Search of the Informed Citizen: What Americans Know About
Politics and Why It Matters, 4 COMM. REV. 129, 132 (2000).
160
Somin, supra note 49, at 1304; see also, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information
Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 194 (1996) (“The political ignorance of the
American voter is one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics . . . .”).
161
Importantly, Delli Carpini and Keeter found that “citizens who are the most informed about one
aspect of national politics tend to be the most informed about other aspects.” DELLI CARPINI & KEETER,
supra note 150, at 18. The public’s general lack of knowledge about politics can therefore be assumed to
hold for agency activity. See also Schacter, supra note 35, at 9 (arguing that studies of voter knowledge
“make it wildly implausible to believe that voters know enough . . . to make workable the accountability
axiom”).
162
As noted earlier, in theory at least, informational cues based on knowledge that voters themselves
lack, such as newspaper endorsements, could enable voters to cast their ballots as if they were properly
informed. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
157
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electoral reward or punishment for the President. Unsurprisingly, given that
there is no work on voters’ knowledge of agency conduct, there is also none
on voters’ appraisal of it. However, political scientists have begun to study
how voters evaluate other elements of presidents’ records, finding that
partisanship infects these evaluations to their core. Assuming that this
conclusion is generalizable, it means that any retrospective voting that occurs
based on agency performance deviates markedly from the theoretical ideal.
Larry Bartels has conducted the most probing analysis of how
partisanship biases voters’ judgments of objective indicators. For a series of
variables—unemployment, inflation, crime, and so on—he compared
Democratic and Republican respondents’ views of how the measures
changed during President Ronald Reagan’s and President Bill Clinton’s
terms.163 In many cases, he found gaping and self-serving partisan
differentials, with Democrats stating that conditions improved under
Democratic control and worsened under Republican rule, and Republicans
exhibiting the opposite pattern.164 For example, Democrats (wrongly)
thought that unemployment and inflation increased during President
Reagan’s tenure.165 Likewise, Republicans (incorrectly) asserted that federal
spending on the poor rose under President Reagan and that the crime rate
went up under President Clinton.166
Delli Carpini and Keeter relied on the same survey data as Bartels, but
added a twist showing how factual misperceptions distort retrospective
voting. Like Bartels, they determined the proportions of respondents who
mistakenly believed that the federal government’s spending on the poor, the
environment, and public schools increased under President Reagan.167 But
unlike Bartels, they then calculated the shares of these respondents who
approved of the supposed spending increases and who voted for Vice
President George H.W. Bush in the 1988 presidential election.168 These
shares were very high, between two-thirds and three-fourths, suggesting that
many voters held inaccurate views of the federal government’s activity in
163
Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 24 POL.
BEHAV. 117, 126–38 (2002).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 136.
166
Id. at 136–37; see also Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We’re Thinking:
The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy 13–14 (Aug. 3–Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript
prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association),
https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/AchenBartels011107/AchenBartels011107.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XG4E-YLB2] (reporting similar findings); Christopher S. Elmendorf & David
Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 380 (same).
167
DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 263–64.
168
Id.
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the 1980s, favored this purported activity, and voted to continue it.169 In
essence, these voters rewarded Republican administrations for policies they
did not actually enact, or alternatively, failed to punish the administrations
for adopting policies the voters opposed.
If this finding applies to agency actions, it implies that retrospective
voting on their basis is warped. Democrats and Republicans who know about
the actions assess them differently, with Democrats supporting steps taken
during Democratic administrations and opposing ones implemented in
Republican terms, and Republicans doing the opposite. The reward–
punishment model on which accountability depends is thus compromised.
To some degree, presidents are rewarded by their copartisans and punished
by the other party’s adherents no matter what agencies actually do.
3. Voter Attributions
This brings us to the third and most important criterion that must be met
for the Court’s claim to be correct: when the President exercises more control
over agencies, voters must attribute more responsibility to her for the agency
conduct. Two of the reasons for doubting this link should be familiar from
the preceding discussion. Many voters have no idea how much influence the
President wields over different agencies; and many voters’ attributions of
responsibility for agency actions are driven more by partisanship than by the
President’s sway over the bodies. These problems with the Court’s account
are complemented by another one: many voters overattribute responsibility
to the President, deeming her fully in charge of even independent agencies.170
Again, no data exists on voters’ knowledge of presidential control over
agencies. But again, Ruder’s study of the New York Times’s coverage of
agency activity is instructive. For an array of agencies, he calculated the
fraction of newspaper articles that mentioned both the agency and the
President—a rough but passable proxy for presidential authority over a
body.171 He found that there is essentially no connection between this fraction
169

See id.
A further problem, highlighted conceptually by Aziz Huq and empirically by Jed Stiglitz, is that
presidential powers thought to increase control over agencies may not actually have this effect. Instead,
the exercise of these powers may prompt responses by other actors, Congress in particular, leaving
presidential control unchanged or even diminished. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53 (2013) (discussing these “[s]trategic response effects”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Folk
Theories and Constitutional Values, Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 16-10, at 16 (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737997
[https://perma.cc/RMF9-HEGJ]
[hereinafter Stiglitz, Folk Theories] (finding that the presence of the legislative veto increases
gubernatorial accountability for economic performance); Stiglitz, supra note 98, at 1163–65 (finding that
after the legislative veto was invalidated in Missouri, the legislature compensated for its loss by enacting
more specific statutes).
171
See Ruder, supra note 147, at 531 (“This measure captures media attention to the broad range of
issues that involve the president and federal agencies: appointments, political controversy, and public
170

1026

112:989 (2018)

Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law

and whether an agency is executive or independent. The President was
named in fewer articles (below 15%) on executive agencies like the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.172
But she was cited in more articles (above 30%) on independent agencies like
the Federal Election Commission and the Federal Reserve.173
According to Ruder, this analysis “reveals one possible way that the
accurate assignment of blame can be undermined by news coverage of
agencies.”174 “[A]gencies that are relatively insulated from presidential
control [can] receive a large share of articles that mention the president,” and
vice versa.175 But there is an even more obvious way that accurate
responsibility attributions can be foiled. Voters can simply be uninformed
about presidential influence over agencies, not misinformed by the media.
Survey evidence shows that only about one-quarter to one-third of
respondents can identify agency heads such as the Treasury Secretary and
the Chair of the Federal Reserve.176 These low figures make it highly
implausible that much of the public knows, say, whether an agency is led by
a single official or a multimember board, or whether the President’s removal
power is plenary or limited to good cause.
Beyond voters’ lack of information, their partisanship also impairs their
attributions of presidential responsibility. Thomas Rudolph has found that,
under divided government in the late 1990s, Democrats who thought the
economy was improving were more inclined to credit President Clinton for
the progress.177 Conversely, Democrats who saw the economy as worsening
tended to blame the Republican Congress for the deterioration.178 More

discussions of agency policy.”); see also Stiglitz, supra note 98, at 1170–71 (using newspaper mentions
of the governor to measure gubernatorial control over state agencies).
172
Ruder, supra note 147, at 531.
173
Id. Ruder carried out a similar analysis for newspaper articles mentioning executive agencies and
referring specifically to regulation. One might expect the President to be named in about the same
proportion of these articles no matter which agency is covered. But in fact, the proportion of articles
identifying the President varies from about 20% (for the Food and Drug Administration and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration) to roughly 60% (for the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Small Business Administration). Id. at 534.
174
Id. at 532.
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 79 (“[F]ewer than a quarter of those asked
were able to identify the holders of any but the most visible and prestigious cabinet posts . . . .”); SOMIN,
supra note 157, at 36 (36% of the public could name the Treasury Secretary and the Chair of the Federal
Reserve in 2008).
177
Thomas J. Rudolph, Who’s Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of
Responsibility Attributions, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI . 698, 704–06 (2003).
178
Id.; see also Brad T. Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson, Causal Attribution and Economic Voting in
American Congressional Elections, 56 POL. RES. Q. 271, 277 (2003) (finding that “Democrats are much
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recently, Steven Nawara has extended Rudolph’s work to the Obama era, to
foreign policy as well as the economy, and to current and former
presidents.179 Again, as Democrats’ impressions brightened of conditions in
the economy and in Iraq, they became more likely to deem President Obama
rather than President Bush responsible for the gains, and vice versa.180
If these results hold for agency actions, they mean that presidents’ credit
or blame for the actions often does not stem from their control over the
bodies. Instead, presidents’ co-partisans commonly consider them
responsible only for agency conduct they favor, assigning authorship to other
actors (like the agency itself) for conduct they dislike. The other party’s
backers tend to behave in the opposite fashion, crediting anyone but the
President for appealing agency measures and blaming her for unwelcome
ones. A mix of partisanship and perception thus drives responsibility
attribution—not, as the Court asserts, presidential authority.
A final factor that drives responsibility attribution, especially among
less sophisticated voters, is the “tendency to see the president as the sole
relevant (perhaps omnipotent) governmental actor in the U.S. political
system.”181 In a series of amusing studies, scholars have shown that
presidents are punished at the polls for many events that, objectively, are not
their fault: droughts and floods,182 tornadoes,183 college football defeats,184
even shark attacks.185 If this logic of “blind retrospection”186 is valid for
agency actions too, then once more it is immaterial how much control the
President actually has over the bodies. Whether her influence is high or low,
many voters perceive it to be high, and therefore hold her responsible for
agency conduct.187
more likely than Republicans to see President Clinton as primarily responsible for both the general state
of the national economy and for the federal budget surplus”).
179
Steven P. Nawara, Who Is Responsible, the Incumbent or the Former President? Motivated
Reasoning in Responsibility Attributions, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 110, 120–21 (2015).
180
Id. at 122–24; see also Cigdem V. Sirin & José D. Villalobos, Where Does the Buck Stop?
Applying Attribution Theory to Examine Public Appraisals of the President, 41 PRESID. STUD. Q. 334,
345–47 (2011) (reporting similar results from an experiment involving the economy and foreign policy).
181
Brad T. Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson, Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the
Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS 633, 637 (2008).
182
Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought,
Flu, and Shark Attacks 24–25 (Estudio, Working Paper 2004/199, 2004).
183
Andrew Healy & Neil Malhotra, Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Voting:
Implications for Democratic Competence, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 193, 197–98 (2010).
184
Andrew J. Healy et al., Irrelevant Events Affect Voters’ Evaluations of Government Performance,
107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12804, 12806 (2010).
185
Achen & Bartels, supra note 182, at 14.
186
Id. at 8.
187
Of course, this point cuts in a somewhat different direction from the previous one. If voters
attribute all responsibility to the President, then they do not assign credit and blame on partisan grounds.
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4. Modes of Voting
This leaves the fourth premise on which the Court’s claim rests: that
voters cast their presidential ballots based on their judgments of, and
attributions for, agency actions. If voters evaluate these actions, credit or
blame the President for them—but nevertheless vote on other grounds—then
the three preceding steps are all for naught. Unfortunately for the Court’s
argument, this scenario appears to be the norm. Even retrospective voters
focus on broader issues than agency performance. Retrospective voting also
occurs only sporadically, under certain atypical conditions. And other modes
of voting tend to dominate retrospective voting when pitted against it.
Predictably, there is no direct evidence on the prevalence of
retrospective voting based on agency conduct. However, the inferential case
is very strong that such voting is, at best, highly infrequent. Agencies take
an enormous number of actions, almost all of which are less salient than the
economic and foreign policy conditions that are usually thought to motivate
retrospective voting. It beggars belief that many voters are making their
presidential choices in any large part because of these actions. As Aziz Huq
has remarked, “Federal administration comprises a vast array of entities
taking on an incalculable number of decisions . . . . How can voters use a
single quadrennial ballot to express preferences on that enormous range of
policy decisions?”188
Interestingly, in many circumstances, voters do not even use their
ballots to reward or punish presidential incumbents for the state of the
economy—the classic basis for retrospective voting. In a recent review of
the literature on economic voting, Christopher Anderson concluded that its
impact is “intermittent, highly contingent, and substantively small.”189
Underpinning this conclusion are psychological points that have been
covered already: voters “systematically misjudge the state of the economy

As with most aspects of voter psychology, the solution to this puzzle is that there are many kinds of
voters, all behaving in complicated ways. Partisanship, for instance, tends to be a more powerful driver
for higher information voters, see Achen & Bartels, supra note 166, at 66, 69, while lower information
voters are more prone to holding the President responsible for external developments, see Gomez &
Wilson, supra note 178, at 277.
Voters’ tendency to attribute too much responsibility to the President also gives rise to a different
kind of argument for greater presidential control over agencies: If voters are going to credit or blame the
President anyway for agency actions, why not grant the President more authority over the bodies? This
way voters would assign responsibility to an actor who actually is responsible. This argument, though, is
quite distinct from the Court’s. Its crux is that greater presidential control is advisable given voters’
attribution errors, not that greater presidential control yields greater presidential accountability.
188
Huq, supra note 170, at 64; see also Rubin, supra note 33, at 2080 (observing that most agency
“decisions are simply too fine-grained to become factors in an electoral campaign”).
189
Anderson, supra note 53, at 286.
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even when it is presented to them on a silver platter,”190 and assign
“responsibility for good performance to the party they support and blame
parties they do not like for inferior economic performance.”191 Plainly, if
retrospective economic voting is uncommon, retrospective voting based on
agency performance must be even rarer. The lack of knowledge and partisan
bias that afflict the former must be still more pervasive for the latter.
If voters do not cast their ballots retrospectively in presidential elections
(at least not primarily), how do they cast them? Scholars have not settled on
a single answer, but they have found that several other modes of voting are
more influential than retrospective voting.192 For example, Brad Lockerbie
determined that, in all but one of the presidential elections from 1956 to
2000, “prospective economic items” relating to voters’ future economic
expectations were “much more powerful than their retrospective
counterparts.”193 Party identification and ideology were also stronger
determinants of vote choice than the retrospective items, which were
statistically significant in only three out of twelve elections.194 Similarly,
James Campbell and his coauthors showed that, in presidential elections
from 1972 to 2004, party identification, ideology, and demographic variables
such as income, race, and religion were significant drivers of vote choice.195
Retrospective economic evaluations, though, were not.196
The upshot of these studies is that the Court’s argument about
presidential accountability is mostly wrong. Even if voters know about
agency actions, judge them impartially, and attribute responsibility for them
accurately—all flawed assumptions themselves—voters generally do not
cast their presidential ballots based on these judgments and attributions.
190

Id. at 280.
Id. at 281. For other scholars pointing out the limits of economic voting, see Justine D’Elia &
Helmut Norpoth, Winning with a Bad Economy, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 467, 471 (2014) (noting that
its assumptions are “highly contingent and need not hold in many situations and political contexts”
(internal citations omitted)); Joel A. Middleton, What Do We Know About Economic Voting? 30 (May
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with Northwestern University Law
Review) (“[A]fter decades of research, fundamental debates are unresolved, and it is difficult to say which
of the competing theoretical accounts of this phenomenon have carried the day.”).
192
For a discussion of other modes of voting, see supra Section I.C.
193
BRAD LOCKERBIE, DO VOTERS LOOK TO THE FUTURE? ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS 67 (2008).
194
Id. at 65.
195
Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1092.
196
Id. For additional work in this vein, see DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 254–61
(finding that issue positions are a statistically significant driver of presidential vote choice for wellinformed citizens but economic evaluations are not); FIORINA, supra note 39, at 197 (“In analysis after
analysis, . . . future expectations dwarfed the effects of retrospective judgments . . . .”); LEWIS-BECK ET
AL., supra note 71, at 376 (finding that “for the typical contemporary American voter,” “more lasting
factors” than economic assessments, “such as socioeconomic status and party identification, are formed
first”).
191
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Indeed, voters often do not cast their presidential ballots based on any prior
developments, not even the state of the economy.
5. Countervailing Evidence
However, the Court’s argument is mostly wrong—which is to say
slightly right—for two reasons. The first is implicit in the analysis to this
point. While most voters cannot satisfy the conditions for retrospective
voting based on agency conduct, there are presumably some who can. These
exemplary voters know about higher-profile agency actions, appraise them
reasonably objectively, deem the President more responsible if the agency is
executive and less so if it is independent, and make their voting decisions
partly on these grounds. These voters, that is, hold the President more
electorally accountable for agency performance when she exercises more
control over the bodies, just as the Court supposes.
But while the number of these model citizens is not zero, it is surely
very small. The members of this “information elite”197 are also highly
unrepresentative of the electorate as a whole—not just in their voting
behavior but in their age, gender, income, and race as well. According to
both Delli Carpini and Keeter198 and Somin,199 the most politically
knowledgeable respondents are disproportionately old, affluent, white men.
Even if there is accountability along the lines contemplated by the Court,
then, it is likely to be skewed accountability to a subset of the public. This
sort of “asymmetric[]” accountability, “with too much to some voters and
not enough to others,” may be as normatively troublesome as no
accountability at all.200
The second reason not to reject the Court’s claim entirely is more
empirical. Observationally, Ruder has found that national newspapers are
more than twice as likely to mention the President when reporting on the
antitrust activities of the Department of Justice as when covering those of the
Federal Trade Commission (an independent agency).201 Experimentally,
Ruder has also determined that when subjects read a newspaper article that
cites the aspects of the Commission that insulate it from presidential control,

197

Delli Carpini, supra note 159, at 27.
See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 156–74.
199
See Somin, supra note 49, at 1354–63.
200
Schacter, supra note 35, at 11; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 1474–79 (discussing
the problems caused by officeholders’ asymmetric responsiveness to donors sharing these demographic
traits). Worth noting, though, is the possibility that officeholders might be asymmetrically responsive to
different issue publics depending on the policy, not the same information elite at all times. This sort of
shifting asymmetric accountability may not be as problematic.
201
See Ruder, supra note 98, at 313–14; see also id. at 321 (finding that coverage of the Justice
Department more often has a political valence).
198
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their attributions of presidential responsibility for the Commission’s actions
do not change significantly.202 Conversely, when subjects read an article that
refers to the key structural features of the Minerals Management Service (an
executive agency), their assignments of presidential responsibility rise
dramatically.203 These results dovetail nicely with the Court’s reasoning. The
media sometimes distinguishes between executive and independent agencies
in its coverage, and this distinction affects people’s responsibility
attributions exactly as the Court expects.
As noted earlier, though, the media does not always distinguish between
executive and independent agencies in its reporting.204 It is also doubtful that
people accurately process the information conveyed by the media in nonexperimental settings. And even in controlled experiments, subjects’
responsibility attributions have not been linked to their voting behavior. It
has not been shown, that is, that subjects become more likely to vote for
(against) the President after finding out that an executive agency has a strong
(weak) record. Accordingly, Ruder’s work is not enough to vindicate the
Court’s assertion. Rather, the fairest conclusion from the available evidence
is that presidential control over an agency is largely—but not wholly—
unrelated to presidential accountability for the body’s actions.
B. Congress
1. Voter Knowledge
Next, take the Court’s claim that Congress is more electorally
accountable for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes
itself.205 For this claim to hold, the first prerequisite is that voters know about
202

In this experiment, the key passage that subjects read was: “The FTC, led by a 5-member
bipartisan commission, is designed to function independently from presidential control. The
commission’s current chairman was appointed by the president.” Id. at 326. Compared to the noinformation condition, respondents were somewhat more likely to attribute “a little” or “some”
responsibility to the President, and somewhat less likely to attribute “a lot” of responsibility. See id. at
329.
203
In this experiment, the key passage that subjects read was: “MMS is under the direction of
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, who has led the cabinet-level department as part of the Obama
administration. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, since 2009 alone the Obama
administration has reviewed and approved several MMS regulations related to deepwater oil exploration.”
Ruder, supra note 147, at 521; see also id. at 523 (showing that respondents in the treatment group were
much more likely to assign “a lot” of responsibility to the President).
204
See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
205
See supra Section II.B. Interestingly, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule rebut this claim in
essentially the opposite way that I do. My response is that, empirically, Congress is rarely electorally
accountable for anything it does, so giving Congress more to do would not significantly boost its
accountability. Posner and Vermeule’s argument, on the other hand, is that Congress is already
accountable for its decisions to delegate authority to agencies. Therefore, there is no accountability
shortfall that less congressional delegation could redress. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring
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the decisions, whether they are made by Congress or by another body.
Earlier, I described the work suggesting that most voters know very little
about most agency activity. The media tends not to cover this activity in any
depth, and most voters are so generally uninformed that they cannot be
expected to know much about matters as specific as agency regulations and
adjudications.206
This work is complemented by a sizeable literature showing that most
voters know little about congressional activity either. In their landmark study
of political knowledge, Delli Carpini and Keeter noted that majorities of the
public were unaware of the passage of major education, immigration, and
urban affairs laws in the 1960s.207 In the 1990s, Douglas Arnold cited surveys
revealing “virtually no awareness of important [bills] that the media had
covered more lightly,” addressing issues such as “abortion, campaign
finance, bank bailouts, defense spending,” and several others.208 Also in this
period, John Zaller found that only about 12% of respondents could identify
any bill that their House member had voted on in the previous two years.209
And more recently, Jeffery Mondak and his coauthors reported that only slim
majorities of the public could state correctly whether Congress enacted
legislation on handgun sales or campaign finance during George W. Bush’s
presidency.210
These results are in stark tension with the idea that Congress’s
accountability would improve if only it made more of the hard policy choices
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (2002) (“Congress is accountable when it
delegates power—it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the agency.” (emphasis omitted)).
My only quarrel with Posner and Vermeule’s claim is that it is based on a normative assertion about
what voters should do, not empirical evidence about what they in fact do. See, e.g., id. at 1746 (“If citizens
have the capacity to sanction politicians who make bad policy in statutes, they should also have the
capacity to sanction politicians who . . . delegate authority to . . . agencies . . . .”). My reading of the
literature is that most citizens do not have the capacity to sanction politicians for either making decisions
themselves or delegating those decisions to other bodies.
Also worth noting here is Stiglitz’s finding that, at the state level, legislatures do not change their
drafting practices in response to judicial decisions striking down their laws on nondelegation grounds.
See Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). If this result generalizes to the federal level, then
a revival of the nondelegation doctrine obviously would not increase congressional accountability
because it would not actually change Congress’s behavior.
206
See supra Section III.A.1.
207
See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 80–81.
208
R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS, THE PRESS, AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 117, 123
(2004).
209
JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 76 (1992); see also Donald R.
Songer, Government Closest to the People: Constituent Knowledge in State and National Politics,
17 POLITY 387, 388 (1984) (reporting a similar finding).
210
Jeffery J. Mondak et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass
Attitudes Toward Congress, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 34, 38 (2007).
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itself. Most voters are unaware of these choices when (as is often the case
today) they are delegated to agencies. But most voters would remain
unaware of the choices if Congress were compelled to grapple with them
directly. That, at least, is the import of the fact that most voters do not know
about the bills that Congress already considers.
2. Voter Judgments
For the Court’s argument to persuade, the second requirement is that
voters would appraise the additional decisions that Congress would make if
the nondelegation doctrine were enforced. Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip
Jones have shown that most respondents are willing to give their opinions
on items on the congressional agenda. In a survey that asked about eight
congressional bills, “over 90% of the sample answered at least four of the
questions,” and a plurality offered their views on all eight.211 However,
several experimental studies have determined that the preferences that
subjects express on congressional bills are a function less of the bills’ policy
content and more of the subjects’ partisanship.
All of these experiments proceeded in roughly the same fashion.
Subjects were provided with information about a particular congressional
bill: the Energy Independence Act,212 the DREAM Act,213 the Aviation
Reauthorization Act,214 and so on. Subjects in the control group were then
asked to what extent they approved or disapproved of the bill. In contrast,
subjects in the treatment group were told about the parties’ respective
positions on the bill before being prompted for their own opinion. In all
cases, subjects in the treatment group voiced preferences that were
significantly more aligned with their parties’ stances (and so significantly
more polarized). For example, Democrats’ and Republicans’ views on the
Energy Independence Act became 10–15% more reliably partisan in
response to the cue.215 Attitudes toward the DREAM Act shifted even further
toward the party line, by 15–25%.216

211

Stephen Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones, Constituents’ Responses to Congressional RollCall Voting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 586 (2010).
212
Toby Bolsen et al., The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion, 36 POL.
BEHAV. 235, 244 (2014).
213
James N. Druckman et al., How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation,
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 61 (2013).
214
Matthew S. Levendusky, Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization,
32 POL. BEHAV. 111, 119 (2010); see also Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003).
215
Bolsen et al., supra note 212, at 248.
216
Druckman et al., supra note 213, at 69. A related literature finds partisan differences in overall
congressional approval, with Democrats tending to approve (disapprove) of Congress when it is
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These experiments suggest that congressional accountability would not
rise much even if voters knew about the extra congressional activity
undertaken due to a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. As with existing
legislation, Democratic voters would favor (disfavor) bills supported
(opposed) by Democratic elites, and Republican voters would exhibit the
opposite pattern. Members of Congress thus would not be rewarded or
punished based on the substance of the new legislation. Instead, its political
consequences would largely follow the same partisan fault lines that underlie
the work that Congress already performs.
3. Voter Attributions
The third criterion for the Court’s claim to be correct is that voters
would attribute responsibility accurately for Congress’s additional actions.
At the aggregate level, voters would know which party backed a given
decision and which party objected to it. Likewise, at the individual level,
voters would know whether their member of Congress voted for or against a
particular bill.217
Stephen Bennett tracked the percentage of respondents who knew
which party held more seats in the House of Representatives before and after
each election from 1960 to 1984. This percentage typically hovered between
40% and 50%, though it dropped to 14% in 1980.218 Analogously, the Pew
Research Center asked respondents which party controlled a majority of the
House from 1989 to 2009. Anywhere from 31% of respondents (in 2001) to
86% (in 2009) answered this question correctly, with a long-term average
near 50%.219 Around half of the public therefore has a mistaken impression
(or none at all) of the majority party in Congress. It is doubtful that these
individuals can carry out the more difficult task of crediting or blaming the
right party for any new congressional legislation.

controlled by Democrats (Republicans), and Republicans exhibiting the opposite pattern. See, e.g., THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 477–78 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
217
Additionally, voters would need to attribute more responsibility to Congress for decisions it does
not delegate but rather makes itself. At least in experiments, subjects told about the institution responsible
for a policy do exactly that. See Adam Hill, Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental
Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 311,
322, 327 (2015) (finding that subjects assign less blame to Congress when it delegates to agencies than
when it legislates directly).
218
Bennett, supra note 146, at 427–28.
219
News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Pew Research News IQ Quiz; Well Known: Public Option,
Sonia Sotomayor; Little Known: Cap & Trade, Max Baucus 7 (Oct. 14, 2009); see also, e.g., DELLI
CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 76 (“Over half of those surveyed could also usually . . . say which
party controlled the U.S. House and Senate.”).
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At the individual level, Ansolabehere and Jones220 and Chris
Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw221 have conducted the most useful
research on voters’ knowledge of their Congress members’ positions. Both
pairs of scholars found that survey respondents are often able to distinguish
between the stances of Democratic and Republican members. Over a set of
eight congressional bills, “[t]he overall correlation between the perceived
and actual positions of legislators . . . is .66.”222 However, respondents’
awareness of intraparty differences in voting records is much lower. The
correlation between perceived and actual positions falls to .28 for
Democratic members and .10 for Republican members.223 Similarly, while
59% of the variance in legislators’ voting records is captured by a model
including both parties’ members, this proportion drops to 15% for a
Democrat-only model and 8% for a Republican-only model.224
These findings mean that if the nondelegation doctrine required
Congress to enact more legislation, the correct party would sometimes be
deemed responsible but the correct politicians frequently would not be.
Members who voted against their party would be especially prone to be
credited or blamed for stances they did not actually take. Once again, voters’
lack of information would prevent congressional accountability from
responding in the manner predicted by the Court.225
4. Modes of Voting
The fourth premise of the Court’s argument is that voters would cast
their congressional ballots based on their appraisals of, and attributions for,
Congress’s additional actions. This premise’s doubtfulness is illustrated by
a number of studies that have examined how legislators’ roll call votes
influence their vote shares in subsequent elections. These studies have
determined that most roll call votes have a negligible electoral impact. For
220

Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 586–89.
Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Does the Spatial Proximity Between Legislators
and Voters Affect Voting Decisions in U.S. House Elections? 20–23 (Feb. 2015),
http://cwarshaw.scripts.mit.edu/papers/TW_SpatialVoting150519.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2BT-SMFZ].
222
Id. at 23; see also Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 587 (“Of those who did offer a
judgment about how their members voted on some roll calls, the average percent right equals 72% . . . .”).
223
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 23.
224
Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 588; see also id. (finding that when members voted
with their party, 82% of respondents correctly stated their votes, but that when members voted against
their party, only 42% of respondents correctly stated their votes).
225
As noted earlier, voters’ responsibility attributions for economic and foreign policy conditions
are also skewed by their partisan affiliations. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. This
dynamic has not been studied with respect to congressional bills, but seems less likely to apply in this
context. It is ambiguous who should be credited or blamed for general conditions, but quite clear who
voted for or against legislation. Partisanship thus probably manifests itself more at the appraisal stage and
less at the attribution stage for congressional bills.
221
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instance, Brandice Canes-Wrone and her coauthors found that votes on
environmental policy never significantly affected House incumbents’ vote
shares from 1988 to 2004, and that votes on criminal policy rarely did so.226
Similarly, Gregory Bovitz and Jamie Carson showed that, over the 1974–
2000 period, 80–84% of House incumbents’ votes on “key” bills had no
effect on their electoral performance.227 And assessing House incumbents’
key votes from 2003 to 2012, Tausanovitch and Warshaw concluded that
“there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that voters hold legislators . . .
accountable on important votes.”228
That retrospective voting is not a common voting mode at the
congressional level has also been demonstrated with respect to overall
economic conditions. According to Lockerbie, voters’ prospective economic
expectations dominated their retrospective economic assessments in House
and Senate elections from 1956 to 2002, just as they did in presidential
elections.229 Likewise, according to Raymond Duch and Randolph
Stevenson, voters’ evaluations of the economy were less influential in
American congressional elections from 1980 to 2000 than in the
parliamentary elections of the seventeen other countries in their study.230
These recent analyses confirm what was a contrarian verdict when Robert
Erikson first reached it twenty-five years ago: that past “economic conditions
in fact matter little in congressional elections.”231
If past economic conditions and roll call votes matter little, what factors
matter more? The literature on congressional voting is too rich and varied to
be easily summarized, but almost all studies agree on the importance of three
variables.232 The first is voters’ partisan affiliation; unsurprisingly, voters are
226
Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Issue Accountability and the Mass Public, 36 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5,
18 tbl.1, 20, 24 & tbl.3 (2011).
227
Gregory L. Bovitz & Jamie L. Carson, Position-Taking and Electoral Accountability in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 59 POL. RES. Q. 297, 300–01 & tbl.1 & n.10 (2006) (considering votes on bills
deemed important by Congressional Quarterly).
228
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 46.
229
LOCKERBIE, supra note 193, at 82, 90; see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
230
See RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE: HOW POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS 72–73 (2008).
231
Robert S. Erikson, Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel
Evidence, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 375 (1990); see also Owen G. Abbe et al., Agenda Setting in
Congressional Elections: The Impact of Issues and Campaigns on Voting Behavior, 56 POL. RES. Q. 419,
420 (2003) (noting that “economic policy outcomes . . . are either much weaker or absent [as a driver of
vote choice] at the congressional level”). However, past economic conditions may be more influential for
certain kinds of voters, such as those with ambivalent partisan attitudes, see Scott J. Basinger & Howard
Lavine, Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 175 (2005), or those
who are more politically sophisticated, see Gomez & Wilson, supra note 178, at 279.
232
See, e.g., Matthew K. Buttice & Walter J. Stone, Candidates Matter: Policy and Quality
Differences in Congressional Elections, 74 J. POL. 870, 875 (2012) (referring to party identification,
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very likely to support candidates who belong to the same party as them.
Indeed, “party typically swamps all else in individual-level models of voting
behavior.”233 The second variable is voters’ ideology; voters are strongly
inclined to back candidates who share their political philosophy. As Boris
Shor and Jon Rogowski have written in the best work on the topic, “spatial
proximity between voters and their House incumbents does very well in
predicting individual vote choice.”234 And the third driver is the President’s
approval rating. In both House and Senate elections, the more popular the
President is with the public, the better candidates from her his party do, and
vice versa.235
The potency of presidential approval is notable because the President is
a distinct political actor from Congress. Congressional elections become
what political scientists call second-order to the extent they are shaped by
external presidential forces rather than internal congressional ones.236
Electoral accountability is impossible in second-order elections since
incumbents prosper or suffer based on developments beyond their control.
Of course, party and ideology are first-order variables relating to Congress
members themselves. But they too are inconsistent with the Court’s claim
that accountability would rise if the nondelegation doctrine were enforced.
Voters who cast their congressional ballots based on partisan affiliation and

ideology, and presidential approval as “standard predictors in the congressional elections literature”).
Two more variables worth noting are incumbency and demography. Incumbents enjoy a substantial
advantage over challengers—albeit one that has shrunk in recent years. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, It’s
Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861, 863
(2015). Aspects of voters’ demography, race in particular, significantly influence vote choice as well. See,
e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1351–59 (2016).
233
Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 592; see also GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 146–47 (9th ed. 2016) (referring to “partisanship as the single most
important influence on individuals’ voting decisions”); Elizabeth N. Simas, Proximity Voting in the 2010
U.S. House Elections, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 708, 711 (2013) (finding that “93.9% of all voters voted for
the candidate from their own party” in the 2010 House election).
234
Shor & Rogowski, supra note 69, at 24; see also, e.g., Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at
591 (finding that ideological distance is a highly significant variable in House elections); Brendan Nyhan
et al., One Vote Out of Step?: The Effects of Salient Roll Call Votes in the 2010 Election, 40 AM. POL.
RES. 844, 856 (2012) (same).
235
See, e.g., Jamie L. Carson et al., The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress, 54 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 598, 609 (2010) (finding that presidential approval is a highly significant variable in House elections);
Benjamin J. Kassow & Charles J. Finocchiaro, Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability in the U.S.
Senate, 39 AM. POL. RES. 1019, 1031 (2011) (same in Senate elections).
236
See, e.g., David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 773 n.39
(2017) (noting that elections are second-order when “voters use preferences developed in relation to one
level of government . . . as a guide for voting at an entirely different level of government”). However, the
distinction between presidential and congressional elections is less stark than that between, say,
presidential and municipal elections.
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political philosophy would not cast them based on the extra decisions that
Congress would make.
5. Countervailing Evidence
At least, voters would not generally cast their ballots based on those
extra congressional decisions. Sometimes they would, though, especially if
the decisions were highly salient. That is the consensus of several recent
studies finding that while most congressional votes carry no electoral
consequences, a few high-profile votes do matter at the polls. That is also
why the Court’s argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. If Congress
could no longer delegate policy choices to agencies, it would have to make
some of those choices itself. Typically, the additional choices would be
electorally immaterial. But on occasion, the choices would strike a chord
with voters, and congressional incumbents would be punished or rewarded
for their positions.
The same pieces that established the electoral irrelevance of most
congressional votes also identified several exceptions to the rule. For
example, Canes-Wrone and her coauthors showed that Democratic House
incumbents who supported stringent anti-crime measures in the 1994–1998
period performed several percentage points better at the polls.237 This was a
time of “extraordinary public concern about the issue,” during which it paid
to be tough on crime.238 Similarly, if 80–84% of the key votes examined by
Bovitz and Carson from 1974 to 2000 did not affect House incumbents’ vote
shares, then 16–20% of the votes did have an impact.239 These more
influential matters tended to be ones that attracted more media coverage and
as to which Congress was more evenly divided.240
In the 2000s too, Ansolabehere and Jones determined that three of the
eight roll call votes they analyzed were statistically significant drivers of
voter behavior.241 Voters were more likely to support House incumbents who
backed tax breaks for energy companies, capital gains tax cuts, and the
reauthorization of the Patriot Act.242 And still more recently, Gary
Jacobson243 and Brendan Nyhan and his coauthors244 found that House
incumbents were punished for voting for items on President Obama’s
237

Canes-Wrone et al., supra note 226, at 18, 22.
Id. at 20.
239
Bovitz & Carson, supra note 227, at 300–01.
240
Id. at 303; see also Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 46 (finding “a relatively modest
relationship between the roll call positions of legislators on important votes and citizens’ vote choice”).
241
Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 591.
242
Id.
243
Gary C. Jacobson, The Republican Resurgence in 2010, 126 POL. SCI. Q. 27, 48 (2011).
244
Nyhan et al., supra note 234, at 856–57.
238

1039

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

legislative agenda. At the district level, they did three to five percentage
points worse in 2010 if they supported health care reform, financial
regulation, or the stimulus package.245 At the individual level, survey
respondents were about five points less likely to vote for them if they backed
Obamacare.246
Plainly, most of the decisions that Congress would have to make if the
nondelegation doctrine grew teeth would not be as momentous as
Obamacare—or even tax breaks for energy companies. This mine run of new
legislation would not change incumbents’ electoral fortunes, and the Court’s
claim is wrong with respect to it. But the Court’s claim is not necessarily
wrong with respect to that small subset of agency business that draws
widespread attention and that would have to be handled by Congress, not the
administrative state, if nondelegation were a binding rule. The available
evidence indicates that congressional incumbents would sometimes be held
accountable for this atypical activity.247
C. State Governments
1. Voter Knowledge
Now turn to the Court’s argument that state governments are more
electorally accountable when they are not commandeered (or otherwise
compelled to act) by the federal government.248 This argument has the same
four prerequisites as the Court’s claims about presidential and congressional
accountability: in the absence of federal commandeering (or its equivalent),
voters must be aware of state governments’ actions, appraise them, attribute
responsibility for them, and vote based on these appraisals and attributions.
The argument also has the same flaws as the Court’s other claims, namely,
that the four prerequisites are rarely satisfied. As these flaws should be
familiar by this point (and as the body of relevant work is smaller for state

245

Jacobson, supra note 243, at 49.
Nyhan et al., supra note 234, at 856–57.
247
For this to be true, congressional incumbents would also have to be deemed more responsible for
bills they vote on than for policies enacted by agencies. As noted earlier, this is indeed the case. See supra
note 225. It is also worth flagging the potential downside of asymmetric accountability if the
nondelegation doctrine were revived. Cf. John D. Griffin & Patrick Flavin, Racial Differences in
Information, Expectations, and Accountability, 69 J. POL. 220, 226 (2007) (finding that white constituents
are more likely than African-American constituents to hold House members accountable for their voting
records).
248
See supra Section II.C.
246
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governments than for the President or Congress249), I march through them
fairly briskly.
First, with respect to voter knowledge, people are at least as unaware of
state policies as of federal ones. Delli Carpini and Keeter conducted a statelevel survey of political information in Virginia. They found a high
correlation between respondents’ (low) knowledge of national politics and
their (even lower) knowledge of state politics.250 They also found that state
political knowledge has almost the same demographic and socioeconomic
determinants (age, education, gender, income, and so on) as national political
knowledge.251 Donald Songer carried out another state-level informational
survey, this time in Oklahoma. He determined that about one-quarter of
respondents could identify their state representative, compared to roughly
half who could name their member of Congress.252 He also showed that
respondents were about three times more likely to state correctly their
Congress member’s votes on high-profile bills (31%) than their state
representative’s stances (11%).253
The implication of these results is that even when state governments
make their own decisions, free from any federal interference, voters are often
unaware of the decisions. Lacking this knowledge, voters are often unable to
reward or punish state governments for their choices. As Steven Rogers has
observed, the “[l]ittle media attention” given to state governments combines
with the presence of “uncompetitive political environments” to “create
unfavorable conditions for accountability in many states.”254
2. Voter Judgments
Second, with respect to voter judgments, they are distorted by
partisanship whether they involve specific state policies or general state
conditions. At the policy level, John Bullock performed an experiment in
249

Kevin Arceneaux, Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?,
35 PUBLIUS 297, 297 (2005) (“Few studies have focused on representational linkages in a federal
system.”).
250
DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 151 (reporting a correlation of 0.74).
251
Id. at 149 tbl.4.2. The main differences are that employment status is significant at the state but
not at the national level, and that race is significant at the national but not at the state level. Id.
252
Songer, supra note 209, at 390; see also Steven Rogers, Accountability in State Legislatures:
How Parties Perform in Office and State Legislative Elections 4–5 (Oct. 17, 2013) (job market paper,
Vanderbilt
University),
http://www.stevenmrogers.com/Dissertation/ChapterDrafts/
CollectiveAccountability/Rogers-CollectiveAccountability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9RJ-JQWC]
(reporting a similar result).
253
See Songer, supra note 209, at 393; see also Steven Rogers, Electoral Accountability for State
Legislative Roll Calls and Ideological Representation, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555, 557 (2017) (noting
that state legislative elections receive less than one-fourth of the media coverage of congressional
elections).
254
Rogers, supra note 253, at 557.
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which he informed his subjects about either an expansion or a contraction of
a state’s Medicaid program.255 He also told some of his subjects about the
positions taken on the issue by the state’s Democratic and Republican
legislators. As in the analogous congressional studies, Democratic subjects
became more (less) supportive of Medicaid expansion if they learned that
Democratic legislators backed (opposed) the measure.256 Republican
subjects’ views swung even further toward the stances of Republican
elites.257
At the level of state economic conditions, Adam Brown found that they
were assessed differently in 2006 by Democratic and Republican
respondents living in states with Democratic governors. Democrats
(Republicans) in these states tended to think that the state economy was
stronger (weaker) than the national economy, which was associated with
President George W. Bush and the Republican Congress.258 Conversely,
Democrats’ and Republicans’ state economic evaluations were nearly
identical in states with Republican governors.259 There was no partisan
distinction that these respondents could make between local and national
conditions, both of which were linked to Republican rule.
These findings suggest that even when voters know about the records
that state governments have autonomously compiled, their partisanship still
impairs them from holding the governments accountable. Democratic voters
tend to approve of poor performances by Democratic administrations and to
frown on good ones by Republican administrations. Republican voters tend
to do the opposite. As a result, objective accountability is replaced, to some
degree, by a partisan dynamic untethered to reality.
3. Voter Attributions
Third, with respect to voter attributions, they are compromised both by
a lack of information about state governmental duties and by partisanship.
As to information, Rogers determined that respondents in 2010 were about
thirty percentage points less likely to know which party controlled their state

255
John G. Bullock, Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 496, 500 (2011).
256
Id.
257
Id.; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence
on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 811 (2003) (finding that subjects’ opinions
on a state welfare program are much more affected by party endorsements than by the program’s
generosity or stringency).
258
Adam R. Brown, Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy? Partisanship, Blame, and
Divided Federalism, 72 J. POL. 605, 610–11 (2010).
259
Id.
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legislature than which party held a majority in Congress.260 Similarly, Fred
Cutler showed that respondents essentially guess when asked to rate states’
authority over various policy areas—agriculture, health care, taxes, and so
on. “[V]ariation across issues is strikingly minimal,” and all of “[t]he means
are between six and eight on the 0–10 scale.”261 Because respondents’
assignments of state responsibility are little more than speculation, it is
unsurprising that, in a separate analysis, Robert Johns was unable to explain
the vast majority of their variation. The weakness of Johns’s models implied
that the assignments “were in many cases nonattitudes, delivered off the top
of respondents’ heads and not tightly linked to their broader political
thinking.”262
As to partisanship, both Lonna Atkeson and Cherie Maestas263 and Neil
Malhotra and Alexander Kuo264 examined the attitudes of Louisiana
Democrats and Republicans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
According to Atkeson and Maestas, about four-fifths of Democrats blamed
the federal government, then under unified Republican control, for failing to
respond adequately to the storm, compared to only two-fifths of
Republicans.265 Likewise, according to Malhotra and Kuo, roughly threefifths of Democrats thought President Bush was most to blame for Katrina’s
devastation, as opposed to only one-fifth of Republicans.266 In place of
President Bush, Republicans were much more likely than Democrats to fault
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin
(both Democrats).267
These studies add to the pessimistic account of state governmental
accountability. Voters cannot properly reward or punish state governments
260

Rogers, supra note 252, at 4–5; see also id. at 25 (showing empirically that due to their confusion
over party control, voters “sometimes punish the party that actually is in power when they intend to
reward them”).
261
Fred Cutler, Whodunnit? Voters and Responsibility in Canadian Federalism, 41 CAN. J. POL. SCI.
627, 638 (2008) (surveying respondents in Ontario and Saskatchewan). It is unfortunate that an analogous
American study has not been conducted.
262
Johns, supra note 58, at 67 (surveying respondents in Ontario and Scotland); see also Kevin
Arceneaux, The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held Accountable for the Functions
Relevant to Their Office, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 731, 743–44 (2006) (finding that voters’ responsibility
attributions have little impact on their voting decisions in state and federal elections).
263
LONNA RAE ATKESON & CHERIE D. MAESTAS, CATASTROPHIC POLITICS: HOW EXTRAORDINARY
EVENTS REDEFINE PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT (2012).
264
Malhotra & Kuo, supra note 56.
265
ATKESON & MAESTAS, supra note 263, at 81; see also Cherie D. Maestas et al., Shifting the
Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS
609, 620 (2008) (finding that Republicans were more likely to blame the Democrat-run state government
for failing to ask for enough help).
266
Malhotra & Kuo, supra note 56, at 127.
267
Id.
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for their actions when, due to voters’ lack of information and partisan bias,
they cannot accurately attribute responsibility for those actions. The
evidence of voters’ confusion over state governments’ duties is especially
damning for the Court’s claim. It means that even when states are not being
compelled to do anything by their federal overseers, many voters are unsure
which level of government is in charge of each policy area. The lines of
accountability, that is, are blurred even in the absence of federal
commandeering.268
4. Modes of Voting
Lastly, with respect to modes of voting, state legislative elections are
mainly second-order and gubernatorial elections are considerably so. To the
extent these elections are first-order, they are also dominated by nonretrospective voting. Rogers recently completed the most thorough analysis
of the drivers of state legislative outcomes, showing in several ways that they
are mostly national in scope. For instance, seat changes in state legislative
elections were almost perfectly correlated with seat changes in congressional
elections from 1910 to 2010.269 Likewise, state legislative results were
largely unaffected by states’ economic growth rates, standardized test scores,
and crime rates from 1972 to 2010.270 At the voter level, presidential approval
exerted more than three times the influence of state legislative approval on
respondents’ state legislative vote choices in 2008 and 2010.271 And at the
state legislator level, out of thirty bills that both representatives and the
public voted on from 1998 to 2014 (because they doubled as referenda),
twenty-six had no perceptible impact on representatives’ subsequent vote
shares.272
268
As with the Court’s congressional accountability claim, see supra note 205, some scholars rebut
the Court’s state governmental accountability claim in the opposite way that I do. I argue that state
governmental accountability is low whether or not federal commandeering takes place. In contrast, they
assert that state governmental accountability is high even in the presence of commandeering because
voters can accurately discern which level of government is responsible for each policy. See, e.g., Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement
Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1063 (1995) (contending that voters “can investigate whether
those actions lie within the discretion of that [state] executive . . . or whether they are mandated by . . .
federal statute”); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2006) (arguing that citizens who care about public affairs can discern
which governmental body is responsible for a particular regulation). The problem with this position is
again empirical. There is no evidence that most voters can distinguish between state and federal policy
responsibilities, and much evidence that they usually cannot.
269
Rogers, supra note 252, at 5–6.
270
Id. at 13–15.
271
See id. at 20; see also id. at 24 (confirming this result with New Jersey survey data from 1973 to
2007).
272
See Rogers, supra note 253, at 568–69 & tbl.6; see also id. at 560–61 (finding that a one standard
deviation increase in a state legislator’s ideological extremism reduces her vote share by only 0.7%);
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As for gubernatorial elections, scholars have debated for years whether
they are shaped mostly or entirely by national forces. The early
“conventional wisdom” was that a “national-level effect” prevailed,
“whereby only incumbent candidates of the president’s party are rewarded
or punished based upon prevailing economic conditions” nationwide.273 But
more recent studies have effectively challenged this consensus, finding that
gubernatorial outcomes are a function of both national factors, especially the
state of the economy and the President’s approval rating, and state
variables.274 There is no need to settle this argument here; the key point for
present purposes is that “[f]ew dispute that national partisan trends and
national economic conditions influence gubernatorial approval and
elections.”275 Gubernatorial elections are thus at least partly second-order.
Moreover, insofar as state legislative and gubernatorial elections are
first-order, retrospective voting takes a back seat in them to other voting
modes. These other modes are the usual suspects from the earlier discussions
of presidential and congressional voting: party, ideology, and demography.276
In state legislative elections, Bradford Bishop and Rebecca Hatch
determined that all three of these factors are more potent than voters’
approval of the state legislature’s performance. 277 Similarly, in gubernatorial
elections, Atkeson and Randall Partin278 and Richard Niemi and his
coauthors279 both showed that evaluations of the state economy are typically
less influential than other forms of first-order voting.

Nathaniel A. Birkhead, The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections, 40 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 70
(2015) (coming to a nearly identical conclusion); Robert E. Hogan, Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent
Reelection in State Legislatures, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 858, 869 (2008) (finding that a state legislator’s vote
share is unrelated to her voting record).
273
Lonna Rae Atkeson & Randall W. Partin, Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 100 (1995); see also, e.g., John E.
Chubb, Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections, 82 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 133, 145
(1988) (“[S]tate voters have generally and increasingly looked outside of the state—to the national
economy and the president’s imputed performance in managing it.”).
274
See, e.g., Thomas M. Carsey & Gerald C. Wright, State and National Factors in Gubernatorial
and Senatorial Elections, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 994, 1000 (1998); Cohen & King, supra note 42, at 1277;
Richard G. Niemi et al., State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?,
39 AM. J. POL. SCI . 936, 952 (1995); Justin Wolfers, Are Voters Rational?: Evidence from Gubernatorial
Elections
6–7
(Jan.
30,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/papers/Voterrationality(latest).pdf [https://perma.cc/M2D4-ZHTE].
275
Brown, supra note 258, at 606.
276
See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.4.
277
Bradford H. Bishop & Rebecca S. Hatch, Perceptions of State Parties and Voting in State
Elections 25 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Rogers, supra note 252, at
20 tbl.4, 24 tbl.5.
278
Atkeson & Partin, supra note 273, at 104 tbl.2.
279
Niemi et al., supra note 274, at 952–53.
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These results further illustrate the implausibility of the Court’s
argument. Even if voters know about state governments’ decisions, assess
them reasonably, and assign responsibility for them correctly (perhaps
thanks to a lack of federal coercion), voters still need to cast their ballots
based on these assessments and assignments for there to be accountability.
An ocean of evidence, though, indicates that this is simply not how voters
tend to cast their state ballots. Instead, voters tend to cast them above all on
national grounds, and in part on non-retrospective state grounds.
5. Countervailing Evidence
What is left, then, of the Court’s claim? Not much, which is why this is
the domain where I am most inclined to reject the Court’s reasoning outright
rather than merely to discount it. But even here, there do exist certain
findings that lend some tentative support to the Court’s analysis. First, it
appears that at least in a few policy areas, or at least if they are more
knowledgeable, voters are able to distinguish between state and federal
duties. In a survey conducted by Bryan Caplan and his coauthors,
respondents attributed somewhat less responsibility to state and local
governments than to the President and Congress for the economy, and
somewhat more for education and crime.280 In Cutler’s survey, better
educated and more politically aware respondents also came closer in their
responsibility attributions to the judgments of a panel of experts.281 It is
conceivable that these positive results would be worsened by federal
commandeering of state governments. In that event, voters might become
unable to make even the limited intergovernmental distinctions that represent
their current capacity.
Second, the flip side of the above summary of voter behavior in state
elections is that some retrospective voting does take place. At the state
legislative level, Rogers determined that approval of the state legislature is
linked to vote choice,282 that four of thirty bills had measurable electoral
consequences,283 and that extreme incumbents suffer at the polls compared
to their more moderate peers.284 Likewise, at the gubernatorial level, recent
280
Bryan Caplan et al., Systematically Biased Beliefs About Political Influence: Evidence from the
Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey, 46 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 760, 761 & tbl.1
(2013); see also Thomas J. Rudolph, Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility,
65 J. POL. 190, 204 (2003) (finding that “respondents are more likely to attribute responsibility to the
governor as the partisan power of the governor’s party increases”).
281
See Cutler, supra note 261, at 645; see also Johns, supra note 58, at 66 (finding that “[e]ducation,
political knowledge, and willingness to vote are all associated with” more accurate responsibility
attributions).
282
Rogers, supra note 252, at 20 tbl.4.
283
Rogers, supra note 253, at 568.
284
Id. at 556; see also Birkhead, supra note 272, at 70.
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studies agree that states’ economic conditions affect governors’ electoral
performances,285 and the same may also be true of governors’ fiscal records286
and responses to natural disasters.287 Again, it is possible that these flickers
of accountability would die out if the federal government began compelling
the states to act. Then voters might abandon even the occasional
retrospective voting in which they now engage.
The problem with these two defenses, though, should be readily
apparent. Both of them rely entirely on conjecture about what could happen
if state governments were federally conscripted. There is no evidence that
voters’ attributions of responsibility or retrospective decisions—such as they
are—actually would be attenuated in that scenario. There is only a status quo
that is not entirely devoid of accountability, and a suspicion that things might
change for the worse if federal interference intensified. This suspicion is not
wholly fanciful, but it is still a flimsy foundation for a claim of constitutional
stature.
D. Incumbents
1. Affirmative Evidence
The Court’s final assertion about accountability is that it is enhanced by
campaign finance deregulation—specifically, by the unlimited campaign
spending that deregulation enables.288 This assertion differs from the Court’s
other arguments in that it applies to all incumbents, not to officeholders in a
particular branch or level of government. For this reason, the assertion is best
rebutted not by (once again) going through the conditions for retrospective
voting, but rather by following the causal path between campaign finance
regulation and accountability. There are three major steps along this path, all
of which defy the Court’s expectations. First, regulation reduces incumbents’
spending advantage over challengers. Second, incumbents’ smaller spending
advantage produces more competitive elections. And third, voters respond to
greater competition by learning more about incumbents’ records and more
often voting based on them.
The crucial backdrop for the first step is that, in the absence of
regulation, incumbents raise and spend far more money than challengers.
285

See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
Robert C. Lowry et al., Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States,
92 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 759, 765–67 (1998).
287
John T. Gasper & Andrew Reeves, Make It Rain?: Retrospection and the Attentive Electorate in
the Context of Natural Disasters, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI . 340, 350 (2011).
288
See supra Section II.D. The Court has made this assertion in cases involving expenditure limits,
but its logic extends to all campaign finance regulation. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 140, at 1072
(advancing the claim with respect to all “[c]ampaign finance reform measures”).
286
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Incumbents have wider fundraising networks than their opponents, deeper
relationships with donors, and more sticks and carrots with which to solicit
contributions—and they exploit these assets to the hilt. In 2006, for example,
state house incumbents raised an average of $172,000 in states with no (or
very high) contribution limits, while their challengers mustered only
$37,000.289 Similarly, in the most recent congressional election, incumbent
House members collected an average of $1.6 million, compared to only
$232,000 for their challengers.290
Precisely because incumbents benefit from deregulation, regulation
curbs their resources more than it does those of their opponents. Challengers’
capacity to attract donations is low enough that it is unaffected by most
fundraising restrictions. Incumbents’ capacity, in contrast, is much higher,
and so is materially constrained by regulation. In the most rigorous study of
this topic, Thomas Stratmann found that, in state house elections from 1996
to 2006, tight individual contribution limits increased challengers’ share of
total spending by seven percentage points, and decreased the fundraising gap
between incumbents and challengers by twenty percentage points.291 Strict
contribution limits on political action committees (PACs) shrank
incumbents’ spending advantage by a similar amount.292 So did caps on
donations from corporations, unions, and PACs in gubernatorial elections
from 1990 to 2000, as reported by Kihong Eom and Donald Gross in another
valuable study.293
Notably, regulation also tends to equalize candidates’ resources when
it takes the form of public financing rather than restrictions on contributions.
Challengers’ spending rises due to the infusion of public funds, while
incumbents’ spending falls due to the expenditure limits that inevitably
accompany the governmental grants. Examining the consequences of full

289
See Thomas Stratmann, How Close Is Fundraising in Contested Elections in States with Low
Contribution Limits? 9 (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University
Law Review).
290
See Incumbent Advantage, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/
incumbs.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/3Y8F-3AXS]. Of course, congressional campaign finance is
hardly unregulated. Because it is difficult to make causal inferences based on the unitary congressional
system, most of the findings I discuss here come from the states, whose greater regulatory variety
facilitates more sophisticated analysis.
291
Stratmann, supra note 289, at 23; see also Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo,
Competition Policy for Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177, 198
(2006) (finding that in state house elections in 1998, “when states switch[ed] from no limits to having
[maximum] limits . . . incumbents’ share of total contributions in an electoral race [was] lowered by six
percent”).
292
See Stratmann, supra note 289, at 24.
293
Kihong Eom & Donald A. Gross, Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions Between
Gubernatorial Candidates, 59 POL. RES. Q. 99, 107 (2006).
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public financing in state legislative elections from 1990 to 2010, Andrew
Hall determined that it lessened incumbents’ spending advantage by about
seventeen percentage points. That is, incumbents accounted for roughly 72%
of total spending without the policy, but just 55% with it.294 Gross and his
coauthors came to a comparable (though less dramatic) conclusion for partial
public financing in gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 1997.295
The second link in the causal chain is that greater parity in candidates’
resources gives rise to closer elections. It does so for the simple reason that,
controlling for other factors, more spending by a candidate improves her
electoral performance.296 So when the spending differential between
incumbents and challengers is smaller, the gap between their vote shares
shrinks as well. Stratmann established this point with respect to contribution
limits and state house elections from 1980 to 2006. He showed that the
average margin of victory declined from about 55% when there were no (or
very high) limits to roughly 25% when limits were very low.297 Likewise,
David Primo and his coauthors found that in gubernatorial elections from
1978 to 2004, winning candidates prevailed by about ten percentage points
less when contribution limits were in place.298
The same logic holds for public financing; by reducing incumbents’
spending advantage, it erodes their electoral edge too. According to Hall, the
boost that candidates receive due to incumbency falls by roughly 50% in
states with generous governmental grants299—a result confirmed by Timothy
Werner and Kenneth Mayer.300 According to Malhotra, the average margin

294
Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 11–12
(Jan. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review).
295
Donald A. Gross et al., State Campaign Finance Regulations and Electoral Competition, 30 AM.
POL. RES. 143, 155 (2002) (focusing on the spending limits attached to public financing).
296
See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature,
124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 136–41 (2005) (reviewing the literature on how candidate spending and electoral
performance are related).
297
Thomas Stratmann, Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from Competition?,
9 ELECTION L.J. 125, 135 (2010); see also Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo, supra note 291, at 189–90 tbl.4
(showing the same).
298
David M. Primo et al., State Campaign Finance Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage
in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 268, 278 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006); see also Raymond J.
La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, The (Non-)Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Macro Political
Outcomes: Evidence from the States 19 (Mar. 7, 2012) (manuscript on file with author),
http://people.umass.edu/schaffne/laraja_schaffner_spendingbans.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8EQ-E8PF]
(finding that corporate spending bans reduce incumbents’ reelection rate by about three percentage
points).
299
Hall, supra note 294, at 15 (showing a decline in the incumbency advantage from 10% to 4%).
300
Timothy Werner & Kenneth R. Mayer, Public Campaign Finance and the Incumbency Advantage
17 (Mar. 31–Apr. 3, 2011) (manuscript on file with author) (showing a decline in the incumbency
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of victory drops by ten to forty percentage points when a challenger accepts
full public financing.301 These are striking outcomes, indicating, in
Malhotra’s words, that “clean elections laws are . . . effective tools of
enhancing competition.”302
The last piece of the puzzle is that electoral competition promotes
electoral accountability. Voters acquire more of the information they need to
vote retrospectively in competitive settings, and they actually use this
information to vote retrospectively at higher rates. In a groundbreaking
study, Jones analyzed how voter knowledge and voter behavior are related
in competitive and uncompetitive Senate elections. In competitive elections,
voters are able to state correctly more of the positions taken by incumbent
senators on high-profile bills.303 The jump in voter information from
uncompetitive to competitive elections is equivalent to “the difference
between constituents with no high school degree and those with a postcollege degree,” “the difference between women and men,” and “the
difference between whites and blacks.”304
Furthermore, voters in competitive milieus not only learn more about
incumbent senators’ records, but also are more likely to cast their ballots
based on these records. In the least competitive elections, voters who
disagree with the bulk of their senators’ positions still vote for the senators
about two-thirds of the time.305 In the most competitive elections, in contrast,
“that support all but vanishes,” and poorly represented voters “support the
incumbent just 12.3% of the time.”306 Accountability is thus strongly
connected to competition. “The more competitive a state is, the more
responsive the electorate, and the more an incumbent can expect to be
punished for any ‘out of step’ votes she casts.”307
Together, these three causal steps mean that the Court’s view of how
campaign finance regulation affects electoral accountability is exactly
backward. Regulation does not undermine accountability; rather, it augments
advantage from 4% to 2%); see also Kenneth R. Mayer et al., Do Public Funding Programs Enhance
Electoral Competition?, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 298, at 245, 263 (same).
301
Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona
and Maine, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 274, 276 (2008).
302
Id. at 277; see also Hall, supra note 294, at 15 (“By funding more challengers and reducing
incumbent war chests, public funding can therefore deliver large electoral effects.”).
303
See Philip Edward Jones, The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Accountability,
35 POL. BEHAV. 481, 497–98 (2013).
304
Id. at 499.
305
See id. at 507.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 509. This result is confirmed at the state legislative level by Rogers’s work. Rogers, supra
note 253, at 559 (finding that state legislators’ extremism has more negative electoral consequences in
competitive districts).
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it by (1) decreasing incumbents’ spending advantage, thereby (2) making
elections more competitive, and thereby (3) increasing the prevalence of
retrospective voting. Moreover, this is the case for a wide array of reforms
enacted by the states: contribution limits on individuals, corporations,
unions, and PACs; expenditure limits tied to governmental grants; and partial
and full public financing. All of these reforms change the financial and
electoral environment in ways that render incumbents more accountable for
their actions.
2. Countervailing Evidence
As always, though, there is a catch—two of them, in fact. The first is
that candidate spending tends to improve voter knowledge. Jacobson showed
that, for both House and Senate candidates, voters’ ability to recognize and
recall their names rises along with their per-voter expenditures.308 Similarly,
John Coleman and Paul Manna determined that, for House candidates, their
spending makes voters more willing to assess their ideologies and to state
their positions on various issues.309 These findings suggest that by lowering
candidate outlays, campaign finance regulation could lessen voter
knowledge, and with it, accountability.
But this is a remote prospect. Crucially, while incumbents’ spending
informs voters to a degree, challengers’ spending does so to a much greater
extent. For instance, as Senate incumbents’ expenditures vary from their
lowest to their highest level, the likelihood that voters can recall the
incumbents’ names increases by only 8%.310 The equivalent figure for Senate
challengers is 57%.311 Likewise, the impact of House incumbents’ spending
on voters’ willingness to rate their ideologies is several times smaller than
that of House challengers’ spending.312 This disparity in the efficacy of
incumbents’ and challengers’ outlays is why campaign finance regulation
does not reduce accountability even though it cuts candidate spending. It
primarily cuts incumbents’ less informative expenditures while leaving
largely unscathed challengers’ more edifying ones.

308
See JACOBSON, supra note 233, at 143; see also Jennifer Wolak, The Consequences of Concurrent
Campaigns for Citizen Knowledge of Congressional Candidates, 31 POL. BEHAV. 211, 220 tbl.1, 222 tbl.2
(2009) (same result for House candidates).
309
John J. Coleman & Paul F. Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of
Democracy, 62 J. POL. 757, 772 tbl.5, 774 tbl.6 (2000).
310
JACOBSON, supra note 233, at 143.
311
Id.
312
Coleman & Manna, supra note 309, at 772; see also Wolak, supra note 308, at 220 tbl.2, 222
tbl.3, 225 tbl.4 (finding that challenger spending has a greater impact on voter recognition, recall, and
knowledge than incumbent spending).
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The second catch is that not all restrictions of money in politics foster
accountability. Prior to 2003, the major political parties could raise and
spend unlimited amounts of “soft money.”313 The parties disproportionately
deployed these funds on behalf of challengers, especially challengers in close
races where additional resources might push them over the top.314 In 2003,
though, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),
which banned the solicitation and receipt of soft money.315 In the wake of the
law’s passage, the gap between incumbents’ and challengers’ expenditures
in tight House races grew significantly, from about $600,000 to roughly
$900,000.316 This spike in incumbents’ spending advantage presumably
caused a decline in both competition and accountability,317 though
regrettably, this hypothesis has yet to be tested explicitly.
BCRA is a useful cautionary tale, highlighting how hard it can be to
predict the consequences of campaign finance regulation. That BCRA likely
made members of Congress less accountable, though, in no way implies that
other reforms would do the same. For one thing, most other reforms
(contribution limits, public financing, and so on) have been around for
decades. There has thus been ample time to evaluate their effects at all
governmental levels. For another, parties are unique among funding sources
in channeling more of their money to challengers than to incumbents.
Individuals, corporations, unions, and PACs all give more heavily to
incumbents,318 meaning that when their activities are curtailed, incumbents’
spending advantage falls, and competition and accountability rise.
Accordingly, the BCRA experience is not generalizable, and most campaign
finance laws indeed render incumbents more accountable.

313
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–32 (2003) (discussing soft money, issue advocacy, and
Congress’s investigation into their abuses), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
314
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 249–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase
Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 16 (Jan. 8–11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript prepared for
presentation at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association) (on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review) (showing that in the absence of party limits, challengers receive
16% of their funds from parties and incumbents receive 7%).
315
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133–34.
316
Raymond LaRaja, Will the BCRA Strengthen the Political System? Negative: BCRA Is Not
Improving the Political System, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604, 605 (2005).
317
See Stratmann, supra note 297, at 151 (“[T]his law has probably benefitted the current office
holders relative to their potential challengers.”).
318
Michael Jay Barber, Buying Representation: The Incentives, Ideology, and Influence of
Campaign Contributors in American Politics 17 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review); La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 314, at
8, 16.
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To recap, the Court contends that electoral accountability is both high
in absolute terms and higher in relative terms when (1) the President
exercises more control over federal agencies, (2) Congress delegates fewer
decisions to agencies, (3) state governments are not federally
commandeered, and (4) money in politics is unregulated. An exhaustive
canvass of the empirical literature, though, leads to a very different
conclusion. This survey reveals that accountability is actually low in absolute
terms, and at best marginally higher in relative terms, in the scenarios
contemplated by the Court. The Court is not entirely wrong, but it is only
slightly right.
This point can be made graphically using a final variant of the chart
presented earlier. The x-axis again represents voters’ appraisal of the relevant
actor’s record: the President, a member of Congress, a state government
official, or a generic incumbent.319 The y-axis again denotes the likelihood
that voters will support this actor. According to the empirical literature, as
shown in Figure 3, Scenario 1, there is only a weak and flat relationship
between the two variables even when presidential control is robust,
congressional delegation is rare, federal commandeering is absent, and
campaign finance is unfettered. True, this relationship is not quite as weak
and flat as that captured by Figure 3, Scenario 2 and depicting the opposite
institutional arrangements. But weakness and flatness are still its distinctive
characteristics.

319
As before, an incumbent’s actual record—not voters’ appraisal of her record—works better as the
x-axis for the Court’s campaign finance claim. See supra note 141. Additionally, given that campaign
finance regulation improves accountability and deregulation worsens it, the “Campaign finance limits”
and “No campaign finance limits” lines should be positioned somewhat differently. I omit this adjustment
for the sake of simplicity.
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FIGURE 3: ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE

More presidential control
Less congressional delegation
No federal commandeering
No campaign finance limits

Less presidential control
More congressional delegation
Federal commandeering
Campaign finance limits

IV. ACCOUNTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The error of the Court’s claims raises a number of interesting questions.
Why has the Court gone astray in its reasoning about how different policies
affect accountability? If the Court is committed to promoting accountability,
how might it actually achieve this goal? And is the advancement of
accountability an appealing aim, or are there other democratic values—or
perhaps other modes of argument entirely—that the Court should be
pursuing instead?
These are large questions, too large to be fully answered here. Still, I do
begin to engage with them in this Part. In my view, the Court’s aversion to
empirical evidence is the most important explanation for the inaccuracy of
its assertions. Even a cursory look at the relevant facts would expose the
assertions’ tenuousness, but the Court has never taken this look. To further
accountability, I think the Court would be wise to shift its attention from
institutional relations to electoral competition. The Court has no control over
the aspects of governmental structure that shape accountability, but its
decisions can make elections more (or less) competitive. And precisely
because it is so difficult to move the accountability needle, the Court should
consider prioritizing other democratic goods. The alignment of
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governmental outputs with voters’ preferences, in particular, is both a
compelling aspiration and one the Court can help realize.
A. Explanations
It is rarely productive to speculate about why the Court makes mistakes.
Mistakes tend to be in the eye of the beholder, and guesses about the Court’s
thinking are often entertaining but seldom useful. I therefore abbreviate my
explanations for the Court’s incorrect claims about accountability, aware I
can offer no proof for them.
That said, the most obvious reason why the Court errs seems to be its
insistence on making empirical arguments without first consulting the
empirical literature. I noted earlier that in the many cases in which the Court
has analyzed accountability, it has never supported its analysis with any
factual material.320 It has not referred to academic articles, nor has it
mentioned governmental statistics, newspaper stories, or even anecdotes
about voters’ ability to reward or punish officeholders in different
circumstances. Instead, the Court has relied on what Jed Stiglitz has labeled
“folk theories”—intuitive accounts of how policies relate to accountability
and other abstract concepts, grounded only in the Court’s instincts and
citations to the Court’s earlier (and equally non-empirical) cases.321 These
folk theories are certainly plausible; indeed, their plausibility is why they
have been embraced so readily. But they are folk rather than real theories
because they stem from supposition rather than evidence.
A related explanation is that the Court appears to have an overly
optimistic opinion of voters’ capabilities. It evidently believes that voters are
reasonably knowledgeable about officeholders’ records and duties, and
assess them reasonably objectively. As Justice Scalia once wrote, “the
American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of
considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its
proximate and ultimate source.”322 Given this view of the electorate, it is easy
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See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
Stiglitz, Folk Theories, supra note 170, at 19. Strikingly, the only non-precedential material to
receive much attention in the Court’s discussions of accountability is The Federalist. See Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498, 501, 514 (2010). The Federalist is
impressive in many respects, but empirical analysis is not one of them.
322
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he people are not foolish
but intelligent, and will separate the wheat from the chaff.”), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983) (“[T]he vast majority of the electorate not only
is literate but also is informed on a day-to-day basis about events and issues that affect election
choices . . . .”).
321
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to see how the Court could arrive at its positions on accountability. People
who are neither sheep nor fools should be able to distinguish between
executive and independent agencies, between free and commandeered state
governments, and so on. But as discussed at length above, this view of the
electorate is inaccurate.323 Voters actually tend to be quite uninformed about
matters of public policy, and quite biased in their judgments by their
partisanship. The Court fully grasps neither this reality nor its implications
for the Court’s claims.
Another possibility along these lines is that the Court may discount the
significance of factors beyond its control (such as voter psychology) and
inflate the role of matters it can influence (such as certain institutional
relations). In the empirical literature on accountability, the minds of voters
take center stage. Accountability rises or falls based on what voters know,
how they evaluate it, and on what grounds they choose to vote.324 These
variables, though, are mostly beyond the Court’s purview. What are in the
Court’s domain are aspects of governmental structure not directly addressed
by the Constitution: presidential authority over agencies, federal power over
the states, and so forth. It is unsurprising that the Court emphasizes these
aspects, assigning them great weight as causes of accountability, and
downplays the drivers of voter behavior. If the Court were to acknowledge
the importance of these drivers, it would also have to concede its own
inability to change them.
All of these explanations are basically benign. They attribute the
Court’s missteps to its unfamiliarity with the empirical scholarship, its rosetinted perception of the electorate, or its focus on the tools within its grasp.
Rubin, though, has suggested a less sympathetic hypothesis: that the Court’s
accountability claims are essentially a façade, illogical and unsubstantiated
but “possess[ing] an underlying unity in their hostility to modern
administrative government.”325 On this account, the Court does not really
mean what it says when it argues that certain policies raise or lower
accountability. Rather, it deploys these arguments to accomplish its true
objective: “elected officials gain[ing] power at the expense of the
bureaucracy.”326 As Rubin notes, to the extent the Court’s claims prevail, the
President, Congress, and state governments win clout and federal agencies
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lose it, and all incumbents are released from the constraints of campaign
finance regulation.327
Rubin’s hypothesis violates the old adage never to attribute to malice
that which can be attributed to incompetence.328 It also relies more than I
would like on psychoanalysis of the Court’s motivations—a recurrent danger
when trying to determine why the Court errs. Still, there may be something
to his theory, especially given the conservative (and so anti-regulatory)
ideologies of the Justices who have composed most of the Court’s paeans to
accountability.329 In any event, I think it is very difficult to rate the merits of
the various reasons for the Court’s mistakes, and I make no further attempt
to do so. Instead, I turn next from explanation to prescription—specifically,
to identifying some of the ways in which the Court (and other actors) could
promote accountability more effectively than they have to date.
B. Levers
To improve accountability, it is necessary to satisfy more fully the
conditions for retrospective voting. It is necessary, that is, to make voters
more knowledgeable about officeholders’ records, more likely to assess the
records fairly, more apt to attribute responsibility for them accurately, or
more inclined to vote based on these assessments and attributions. As I have
stressed, voters’ mental states are at the heart of these conditions. Voters’
mental states, in turn, can be influenced either directly, by changing what
they know and how they evaluate it, or indirectly, by varying the institutional
and electoral context in which they find themselves.
The Court has very little power to affect voter psychology directly. It
also has much less power than it thinks to shape it indirectly by modifying
the institutional backdrop. (Indeed, that was the thesis of the previous
Part.330) But the Court does have at least some ability to alter the electoral
environment, in particular by making elections more competitive. As
explained earlier, competition and accountability are tightly linked because
voters become better informed and more prone to voting retrospectively
when races are closer. 331
327

See id. Rubin does not address campaign finance regulation, so I am guessing at his position on

it.
328
See
Hanlon’s
Razor,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hanlon%27s_razor&oldid=819810925
[https://perma.cc/7FAU-4MMV].
329
The only exceptions are Justice Breyer in a pair of administrative law cases, see supra notes 95–
96 and accompanying text, and Justice Brennan in a congressional nondelegation case, see supra note
107 and accompanying text. These are quite minor opinions in the accountability canon.
330
See supra Part III.
331
See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text.
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One way the Court could make elections more competitive should
already be apparent. Rather than striking down campaign finance laws (as
has been its wont in recent years), the Court could uphold them. It is
reasonably clear that contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public
financing result in narrower contests by reducing incumbents’ spending
advantage.332 A Court intent on fostering accountability could acquiesce in
these policies rather than subjecting them to stringent scrutiny.
Another tack the Court could try is nullifying bipartisan gerrymanders
that protect both parties’ incumbents from any serious challenge. These
kinds of district plans are typically enacted in states where neither party fully
controls the state government. Unable to engage in partisan gerrymandering,
the parties agree on maps that allocate safe seats to almost all sitting
legislators. Plainly, such maps suppress competition by prioritizing seat
safety above other redistricting considerations. Equally plainly, the Court
could enhance competition by refusing to countenance them.333
A further proposal is for the Court to intensify its review of regulations
that make it difficult for third-party candidates to qualify for the general
election ballot.334 These rules usually take the form of large numbers of
signatures that need to be gathered by an early deadline, and they tend to be
backed by the major parties, which prefer not to face third-party
opposition.335 The rules, it is true, do not necessarily decrease the winning
candidate’s margin of victory. Rather, their electoral impact depends on the
relative appeal of the major-party candidates and on which of them would be
more harmed by the entry of a third-party challenger. But in his valuable
work on the topic, Jones determined that it is not just a lower margin of
victory that heightens accountability, but also broader notions of competition
such as ideological divergence.336 Third-party candidates certainly contribute
to such divergence, so if the Court facilitated their ballot access, it would
also render major-party incumbents more accountable.
All of these ideas for judicial intervention involve the lever of
increasing competition. Again, this is because the Court’s tools do not allow
it to change voters’ mental states directly or to revise the governmental
332

See supra Section III.D.1.
For a well-known proposal along these lines, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 600 (2002) (characterizing “the risk in gerrymandering” as
“constriction of the competitive processes by which voters can express choice”).
334
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have supported this idea too. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard
H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 683–
84 (1998) (criticizing “a bipolar effort to frustrate third-party challenges” by banning fusion candidacies).
335
See id. at 684.
336
See Jones, supra note 303, at 500 (also finding that demographic diversity increases
accountability).
333
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structures that regulate accountability. Other actors, though, do possess these
potent tools, and could use them in a variety of ways. With respect to voter
psychology, the media has the capacity both to inform voters and to induce
them to make more accurate responsibility attributions. In a useful study,
Stephanie Larson placed a series of articles about a House member in a local
newspaper, and then tracked awareness of the member’s positions among
respondents who saw and did not see the publication. Respondents who came
across the newspaper learned more about the member’s stances, indicating
that press coverage can boost voter knowledge.337
Also intriguingly, Shanto Iyengar conducted a series of experiments in
which he manipulated the framing of television coverage of poverty. Some
segments employed “episodic” framing emphasizing specific events and
persons, while other segments relied on “thematic” framing discussing the
issue more generally.338 Episodic frames encouraged respondents to attribute
responsibility to individual victims or perpetrators, while thematic frames
prompted attributions to governmental officials or policies.339 At present,
“television news is heavily episodic,” meaning that it “effectively insulates
incumbent officials from any rising tide of disenchantment over the state of
public affairs.”340 If television coverage became more thematic, though,
“Americans might be more apt to consider society or government . . .
responsible.”341
While the media may be the institution with the most sway over voter
psychology, other bodies could also have an impact. The schools, for
instance, could do a better job educating students about the architecture of
American government. If students knew more about how federal, state, and
local authorities are organized, they might find it easier to assign
responsibility for salient developments.342 Similarly, several scholars have
called for the creation of “accountability agencies” that would collect and
337
Stephanie Greco Larson, Information and Learning in a Congressional District: A Social
Experiment, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1102, 1109 (1990). Not only can press coverage make voters more
knowledgeable, it can also make officeholders more electorally accountable for their roll call votes. See
Rogers, supra note 252, at 15–16 (finding that state legislators’ extremism has more negative electoral
consequences when there are more newspaper reporters covering the state government).
338
SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?: HOW TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 14
(1991).
339
Id. at 67.
340
Id. at 16, 137.
341
Id. at 67; see also, e.g., Edwards et al., supra note 148, at 119 (finding that greater media coverage
of an issue increases the President’s accountability for that issue); Maestas et al., supra note 265, at 622
(finding that more exposure to media coverage of Hurricane Katrina increased respondents’ likelihood of
blaming both the federal and state governments for their responses to the storm).
342
See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (discussing the importance of
civic education in a democracy).
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disseminate information about money in politics, public corruption, the state
of the economy, and other sensitive subjects.343 Assuming this information
reached voters, it could help them understand how their government has
performed and who is to credit or blame for the performance.
Still another suggestion for facilitating retrospective voting is to add
more data to the ballot itself. In local elections, ballots are often nonpartisan,
thus barring candidates from stating their party affiliation. Permitting
candidates to make this statement, in Christopher Elmendorf and David
Schleicher’s words, would give voters “a simple, ballot-based indicator of
whether a given candidate would join the dominant coalition or work against
it.”344 More ambitiously, Elmendorf and Schleicher recommend that the
ballot specify the partisan balance of power—that is, which party controls
the executive branch and each chamber of the legislature.345 Voters
frequently lack this vital information for attributing responsibility, so if they
were presented with it, their attribution errors might become less common.
And once the ballot has been opened to unconventional material, even more
adventurous options are available. Why not also include key economic and
social indicators, the government’s fiscal condition, or incumbents’ ideal
points derived from their roll call votes?346
The final lever for promoting accountability is institutional. Unlike the
ones that have preoccupied the Court, certain aspects of governmental
structure do make a difference, typically by influencing how voters assign
responsibility. At all levels of government, term limits are one such aspect.
Incumbents who must leave office at the end of their terms can be neither
rewarded nor punished for what they do in those final periods. Regardless of
their records, they again become civilians when their terms expire. For this
reason, Campbell and his coauthors347 and Thomas Holbrook348 found that
343
See Manin et al., supra note 38, at 50 (listing several such agencies); Mark E. Warren,
Accountability and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 49 (Mark
Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (same).
344
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 166, at 387. Of course, information on party affiliation would
facilitate partisan voting in addition to making it easier for voters to attribute responsibility.
345
Id. at 413.
346
Cf. Andrew Healy & Gabriel S. Lenz, Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond
Primarily to the Election-Year Economy, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 31, 43–44 (2014) (finding that subjects
evaluate prior economic conditions more rationally when given information about cumulative (rather than
annual) growth). The courts would also have a limited role to play here—namely, not to invalidate the
unorthodox ballots. Cf. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525–26 (2001) (striking down a Missouri voter
initiative that required ballots to note if incumbents had failed to support congressional term limits).
347
Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1093 (“In each and every test . . . retrospective voting was found
to be significantly weaker in open-seat elections.”).
348
Thomas M. Holbrook, Incumbency, National Conditions, and the 2012 Presidential Election,
45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 640, 641 (2012) (“The impact of personal finances and presidential approval is
much greater in incumbent races . . . than in open-seat contests . . . .”).
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retrospective voting is significantly less common in open-seat presidential
elections. Also for this reason, eliminating term limits would boost
accountability by increasing the likelihood of incumbents appearing on the
ballot.
Another condition that boosts accountability at all levels is unified
government. When the same party controls both the executive and legislative
branches, it is clearer to voters whom to credit or blame for past events.
Conversely, when authority is divided, it is less obvious which officeholders
are responsible for the government’s record. Consistent with this reasoning,
Kevin Leyden and Stephen Borrelli,349 and Robert Lowry and his
coauthors,350 showed that incumbent governors’ vote shares are more
sensitive to state unemployment and the state budgetary situation,
respectively, under unified government. Likewise, Duch and Stevenson
determined that the incumbent party’s presidential performance is less
closely tied to voters’ perceptions of the economy under divided
government.351
Of course, neither the Court nor any other actor can guarantee unified
government—at least, not as long as powers are separated rather than
combined. However, state and local authorities may have some ability to
make their elections more first-order, and so less dominated by national
forces, by changing the elections’ dates. In a series of comparative studies,
Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels found that when legislative and
executive elections are held concurrently, variables pertaining to the
executive largely explain the legislative results.352 But when the elections are
held separately, “nonconcurrence . . . attenuate[s] the impact of national
factors” and “focuses voters’ and candidates’ energies on local factors.”353
The upshot is that state and local incumbents might become more
accountable for their own records if they were not on the same ballot as

349
See Kevin M. Leyden & Stephen A. Borrelli, The Effect of State Economic Conditions on
Gubernatorial Elections: Does Unified Government Make a Difference?, 48 POL. RES. Q. 275, 283
(1995).
350
Lowry et al., supra note 286, at 765.
351
DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 230, at 258 tbl.9.1. Relatedly, legislators’ accountability is also
higher when their parties are more cohesive. See David R. Jones, Partisan Polarization and
Congressional Accountability in House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI . 323, 329 (2010).
352
See Timothy Hellwig & David Samuels, Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic
Regimes, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 65, 76 (2008) (considering the state of the economy and whether an
incumbent president was running for reelection); Samuels, supra note 38, at 431 (same and also
considering whether the president was in a minority government or in a coalition); see also Wolak, supra
note 308, at 220, 222, 225 (finding that gubernatorial spending usually reduces voter recognition, recall,
and knowledge of House candidates).
353
Samuels, supra note 38, at 427; see also Hellwig & Samuels, supra note 352, at 76.
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national politicians, especially the President. Then their records might be less
swamped by national trends.354
Another way to improve state and local accountability could be to
transfer policymaking authority away from the legislature and to the
executive. Voters know more about national than subnational politics—but
subnationally, they know more about governors and mayors than state
legislatures and city councils. Governors and mayors are much more
recognizable than subnational legislators,355 and there is evidence of at least
some retrospective voting in gubernatorial and mayoral elections.356
Accordingly, if states augmented governors’ appointment and veto powers,
and if cities switched from weak to strong mayors, they would add to the
clout of the one officeholder who can realistically (though still partially) be
held accountable for her actions.357
In theory, these same shifts could be carried out at the federal level.
Congressional elections could be made fully nonconcurrent with presidential
ones, thus rendering them less second-order.358 Or the President’s powers
could be formally enhanced at the expense of Congress’s, thus concentrating
authority in the single official whose elections are most first-order.359 In
practice, these reforms are blocked by the Constitution. Both the timing of
congressional elections and the explicit powers of the President and
Congress can be changed only by constitutional amendment.
354

One downside of nonconcurrent elections, though, is significantly reduced turnout. See ZOLTAN
HAJNAL, AMERICA’S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICS
159 (2010). State and local governments may therefore face a tradeoff between accountability and
participation.
355
See, e.g., Atkeson & Partin, supra note 273, at 101 (“[T]he governor is the second most
recognized elected official, behind the president.”); Schleicher, supra note 236, at 776 (noting that mayors
“are sufficiently high profile that the electorate is able to reward them for good performance”).
356
See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text; see also R. Douglas Arnold & Nicholas Carnes,
Holding Mayors Accountable: New York’s Executives from Koch to Bloomberg, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 949,
958 (2012) (finding that New York City’s mayor is held accountable for the city’s economic conditions
and crime rates).
357
Interestingly, Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen argue that unbundling the executive’s powers
would increase accountability, by enabling voters to reward or punish officials for the particular decisions
that are within their substantive domains. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled
Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1403–05 (2008). Berry and Gersen’s argument is primarily
theoretical, though, and assumes implausibly high levels of voter knowledge. See Schleicher, supra note
236, at 817 (offering a similar rejoinder).
358
For a detailed discussion of the problems with concurrent voting in federal elections, see David
J. Andersen, Pushing the Limits of Democracy: Concurrent Elections and Cognitive Limitations of Voters
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with Northwestern University Law
Review).
359
Cf. Ryan E. Carlin & Shane P. Singh, Executive Power and Economic Accountability, 77 J. POL.
1031, 1037–41 (2015) (finding in a comparative study that presidential accountability for the economy is
higher when the president has more legislative power and issues more decrees).
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The Constitution also bars even more effective means for heightening
the federal government’s accountability. A sizeable comparative literature,
launched a generation ago by G. Bingham Powell and Guy Whitten,
concludes that both pillars of the American system—the separation of
powers and federalism—impede retrospective voting.360 Thanks to the
separation of powers, voters often cannot tell which branch (and which
chamber within Congress) is responsible for a given development. Similarly,
thanks to federalism, voters tend to have trouble distinguishing between
federal and state duties. Both of these problems are alleviated by fusing
rather than separating the national government’s powers and by abrogating
the sovereignty of subnational units—in short, by switching to a
parliamentary and unitary system like Great Britain’s.361 Accountability
reaches its apogee in this sort of system, especially when a single party
commands a parliamentary majority, because the clarity of responsibility is
maximized.
The point of this discussion is not that any of these reforms should be
implemented, let alone that the American model should be scrapped in favor
of the British one. Rather, there are two reasons why it is worth considering
the various techniques through which accountability could be fostered. The
first is the techniques’ very existence, which demonstrates that even though
the Court has not managed to further this value through its interventions, the
value is not incapable of being advanced. In fact, both the Court and other
actors have several tools at their disposal that could make American
government substantially more accountable than it is today.
The second reason is to highlight the oddity of pursuing accountability
in a regime that is, to a considerable extent, designed to frustrate it. Federal,
state, and local authorities operate side by side in the United States, and each
of them is divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which
themselves are segmented even further.362 True, the extraordinary complexity

360
G. Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting:
Taking Account of the Political Context, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 391, 398 (1993) (concluding that “[t]he
greater the perceived unified control of policymaking by the incumbent government, the more likely is
the citizen to assign responsibility . . . to the incumbents.”); cf., Cameron D. Anderson, Economic Voting
and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 449, 456–57
(2006) (studying federalism); Johns, supra note 58, at 70 (same); Richard Nadeau et al., A Cross-National
Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context Across Time and Nations,
21 ELECTORAL STUD. 403, 413 (2002) (studying the separation of powers); Samuels, supra note 38, at
430–32 (same).
361
See DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 230, at 72 (showing that retrospective economic voting is
stronger in Great Britain than in all but one of the other countries in the study).
362
See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information
Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 371 (2010) (“[T]he structures through
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of this system could be greatly reduced, in which case accountability would
rise sharply. But any such effort at rationalization would clash with the
dispersion of power that is the system’s basic premise. Exaggerating only a
bit, one might say that unaccountability is the American way, and
accountability is un-American.
C. Alternatives
There are compelling arguments, then, against the Court’s campaign to
promote accountability through its constitutional jurisprudence. To date, this
campaign has mostly failed to bear fruit. There are only a few other ways in
which the Court could try to make officeholders more accountable, all reliant
on the link between competition and accountability. And while not an
unappealing value, accountability is in tension with what the Court itself has
described as the American “system of division and separation of powers,”
which “produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance.”363
Moreover, as Jacob Gersen and Matthew Stephenson have recently
emphasized, accountability is not an unalloyed good. The crux of the
problem is that agents (that is, officeholders) who are accountable still have
incentives to act contrary to the interests of an imperfectly informed principal
(that is, voters).364 For example, agents might “pander” by enacting popular
but imprudent policies rather than unpopular policies that serve the
principal’s long-term welfare.365 Or agents might “posture” by taking
needlessly bold actions,366 or “persist” in adhering to positions even after they
have been shown to be unwise.367 Because of the possibility of these and
other harmful behaviors, Gersen and Stephenson propose several measures
through which accountability could be curbed.368
But if the Court stopped aiming to improve accountability in its
constitutional cases, what might it do instead? Perhaps the most intuitive
option, urged by Stiglitz, is to fall back on more conventional modes of
which [the United States] is governed are probably the most complicated and confusing of any
contemporary democracy.”).
363
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
364
Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 187 (“The over-accountability problem is essentially an
information problem: sometimes even a fully rational but imperfectly informed principal . . . will reward
‘bad’ actions rather than ‘good’ actions by an agent . . . .”); see also Warren, supra note 343, at 43–45
(making a similar point).
365
See Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 195–98.
366
Id. at 198–200.
367
Id. at 200–02.
368
Id. at 209–31. For another critique of accountability, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT
OF REPRESENTATION 58 (1967) (noting that from an accountability perspective, there is nothing
objectionable about an officeholder “act[ing] in a completely selfish and irresponsible manner . . . as long
as he let himself be removed from office at the end of his term”).
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argument: text, history, precedent, and so on.369 When these modes are
enough to decide a case, that could be the Court’s holding. When they do not
suffice, the Court could decline to resolve the dispute one way or another.
Reasoning along similar lines, Huq has advised against the invocation of
democratic values whenever “there is no reliable and stable correlation
between a rule of decision and those underlying values.”370 In these
situations, he would simply deem the matter nonjusticiable.371
There is much to like about this approach. Its modesty, in particular, is
quite attractive in an era in which the Court is all too ready to exert its will
over vast swathes of American life. A Court that refrained from relying on
democratic values would also be a Court that refrained from making mistakes
based on those values. Unlike our actual Court, it would not nullify
policies—limits on the President’s removal power, delegations of authority
by Congress, federal mandates to the states, regulations of money in
politics—that are thought to lessen accountability, but in fact do not affect
or even increase it.
But while these points carry weight, I ultimately find them
unpersuasive. Pro-democratic judicial intervention is not especially
immodest; rather, as John Hart Ely argued long ago, it implies a more limited
role for the Court than judicial review based on liberty, equality, and other
contested non-electoral concepts.372 That its track record has been poor with
respect to accountability also does not mean the Court would be as prone to
error if it sought to advance other democratic values. It might be clearer how
judicial decisions would impact other values, and the Court might have a
greater capacity to attain them.
The list of democratic goods is long, but typically includes (among
others) popular participation in politics, deliberation by citizens and
officeholders, governmental responsiveness to voters’ preferences, and
governmental alignment with voters’ preferences.373 (Responsiveness and
alignment differ in that the former refers to the rate of change of
representation or policy given a shift in voters’ positions, while the latter

369
See Stiglitz, Folk Theories and Constitutional Values, supra note 170, at 18 (“[C]ourts might
explicitly disavow functionalist motivations as the basis for interpretive stances on structural questions.”).
370
Huq, supra note 170, at 5.
371
Id.
372
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
373
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections
on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1142 (2002); Richard H. Pildes,
Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 690 (2004);
Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 313–16.
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denotes the congruence of representation or policy with voters’ views.374)
This is not the place for full assessments of what constitutional law would
look like if it prioritized each of these goods. Instead, I offer three brief
observations about the alternatives to accountability.
First, participation and deliberation seem ill-suited for star turns
because they would sweep either not far enough or much too far. Doctrine
based on these values would be too confined in its reach if it extended only
to the relatively few policies that directly burden citizens’ ability to vote or
to debate public affairs.375 Conversely, if the Court were willing to call into
question laws that were enacted without sufficient participation or
deliberation, then it is hard to say what statutes would be safe. These values
are rarely targeted overtly, but they are also rarely present to the extent we
might like.
Second, responsiveness appears to have the same drawback as
accountability: that empirically, there is little the Court can do to further it.376
In earlier work, Eric McGhee, Steven Rogers, and I calculated the
responsiveness of median state house members’ ideologies to shifts in voter
sentiment from 1992 to 2012.377 We then analyzed whether a host of electoral
policies—political party regulations, campaign finance laws, redistricting
rules, and aspects of governmental structure—affected responsiveness.378
Essentially none of these policies had any impact.379 As we put it,
responsiveness “does not budge in either direction due to the policies with
which states experiment,” and “is serenely impervious to reform.”380 A Court
that wished to heighten responsiveness would thus quickly find itself at a
loss. It would not be able to vary the value much either by upholding policies
or by striking them down.381
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And third, this empirical difficulty does not apply to alignment. To the
contrary, McGhee, Rogers, and I found that numerous policies are
statistically significant drivers of representational congruence, at the levels
of both the individual district and the legislative chamber as a whole. For
instance, contribution limits shrink the ideological gap between legislators
and their constituents, and redistricting commissions do the same with
respect to the median legislator and the median voter statewide.382 Likewise,
certain types of party primaries, certain redistricting criteria, and term limits
widen the divide between legislators and voters.383 There would therefore be
plenty for an alignment-minded Court to do. Unlike with accountability and
responsiveness, its efforts, if grounded in solid evidence rather than folk
theory, would not yield mostly null results.
Of course, empirical tractability is not the only criterion by which a
democratic value should be chosen. The value’s place in the American
historical tradition, its role in prior cases, and its normative appeal are all
important yardsticks too. My claim, then, is not that the Court should
necessarily drop accountability from its constitutional jurisprudence and
replace it with alignment. Rather, I merely think that before embarking on
any mission of pro-democratic judicial intervention, the Court should
carefully consider the mission’s likelihood of success. Quixotic quests may
inspire great literature, but they do not make for sound doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Several legal scholars have noted the Court’s tendency to wield
electoral accountability “as a rhetorical trump card . . . to justify particular
institutional arrangements or legal/constitutional positions.”384 In this
Article, I have tried to show that accountability has no (or almost no)
business being used in this way. Contrary to the Court’s assertions, the
President is not more accountable for agency actions when she exerts more
control over the bodies; Congress is not more accountable for decisions it
does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself; state governments are
not more accountable when they are not federally commandeered; and
incumbent politicians are not more accountable when campaign spending is
unregulated. At least, any gains in accountability in these circumstances are
so small and contingent that they cannot support the invalidation of properly
enacted policies.
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If accountability were to lose its trump card status, it is not clear how
the Court’s constitutional reasoning would change. The Court could analyze
a range of conventional factors without giving pride of place to any of them.
It could anoint another democratic value, like alignment, as the linchpin of
its case law. Or, as Guy-Uriel Charles has counseled, it could exercise its
power of judicial review only if multiple democratic goods were
threatened.385 What is clear, though, is that it is time for the Court’s
constitutional deck to be reshuffled. Accountability, a value the Court has
tried and failed to promote for decades, does not belong on top of it.
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